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Abstract
Secure communication is critical to many applications. To this end, various security
goals can be achieved using elliptic/hyperelliptic curve and pairing based cryptography.
Polynomial multiplication is used in the underlying operations of these protocols. There-
fore, as part of this thesis different recursive algorithms are studied; these algorithms
include Karatsuba, Toom, and Bernstein. In this thesis, we investigate algorithms and
implementation techniques to improve the performance of the cryptographic protocols.
Common factors present in explicit formulæ in elliptic curves operations are utilized such
that two multiplications are replaced by a single multiplication in a higher field. Moreover,
we utilize the idea based on common factor used in elliptic curves and generate new explicit
formulæ for hyperelliptic curves and pairing. In the case of hyperelliptic curves, the com-
mon factor method is applied to the fastest known even characteristic hyperelliptic curve
operations, i.e. divisor addition and divisor doubling. Similarly, in pairing we observe the
presence of common factors inside the Miller loop of Eta pairing and the theoretical results
show significant improvement when applying the idea based on common factor method.
This has a great advantage for applications that require higher speed.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter briefly introduces the work of this thesis for which the main aim is to improve
and efficiently implement certain algorithms for cryptographic systems. These include el-
liptic, hyperelliptic curves and pairing based cryptography. In addition, algorithms related
to polynomial multiplication and other finite field operations are presented because they
are considered basic blocks of group operations over elliptic curves.
Section 1.1 of this chapter gives a brief overview of the basic communication model
and public key cryptography; it illustrates the use of cryptographic protocols for commu-
nication. In Section 1.2, we show an introduction to private key cryptography and public
key cryptography and also we explain how the elliptic curve cryptographic schemes are
examples of public key cryptography. A short description of the motivation to conduct
this study and the objectives are then highlighted. The final section presents the proposal
organization.
1.1 Communication Model
Assume that we have two communicating parties Alice (A) and Bob (B), who want to
communicate securely using an insecure communication channel where Eve (E), who is a
malicious adversary, is trying to listen to the channel. Cryptography is about designing
mathematical and algorithmic techniques so that Alice and Bob can communicate securely
1
and Eve cannot learn the original message, impersonate either parties, or modify the
message. Figure 1.1 shows these parties in what is called basic communication model.
Figure 1.1: Basic communication model.
Basically, there are five major security goals of secure communication, namely, con-
fidentiality, data integrity, data origin authentication, entity authentication, and non-
repudiation. Confidentiality is when unauthorized users cannot read the message, i.e.,
when A sends a message to B, E cannot understand its content. Data integrity means
that the system should provide capability to make sure that the message has not been
modified. For example, if E modifies the message sent from A, B can detect this. Data
origin authentication is the ability to confirm the data source. When the message claimed
to be from A is received by B, the latter should be able to verify that it is really sent from
A. Entity authentication is to confirm the identity of an entity. For example, B should
be able to trust that the identity of the other communicating party is A. Non-repudiation
means that previous actions or commitments cannot be denied by an entity. If A sent a
message to B, then B can convince a neutral third party that it is indeed from A, and A
cannot deny that.
2
1.2 Symmetric Key Cryptography vs. Asymmetric
Key Cryptography
There are two types of cryptographic systems: symmetric key cryptography and assymmet-
ric key cryptography. In symmetric key cryptography, shown in Figure 1.2a, both parties
agree on a secret and authentic keying material (channel). They can use symmetric key
encryption, like data encryption standard (DES) or advanced encryption standard (AES),
to provide confidentiality. The communicating parties can also use a message authentical
code, such as (HMAC), to provide data integrity and data origin authentication.
The symmetric key algorithms are known to be efficient. However, there are two major
disadvantages of symmetric key cryptography. The first one is the key distribution problem.
Since both parties have to agree on a key and the distribution must be done in a secret
and authentic way, the existence of a secure channel is assumed. The second problem is
the key management problem. If we have a network of N nodes, in this case each node
must maintain N − 1 secret keys.
Diffie and Hellman [1] introduced the assymetric key cryptography system in order to
solve the key distribution problem without the need of a secure channel. This type is
shown in Figure 1.2b. Each party selects a set of keying material (e, d) where e is public
key and d is private key, and it is computationally infeasible to know the private key given
the public key.
Asymmetric key cryptography depends on the intractability of a number-theoretic prob-
lem. RSA asymmetric key encryption and signature schemes [2] are based on the integer
factorization problem. Elgamal asymmetric key encryption and signature schemes [3] are
based on the discrete logarithm problem. Finally, elliptic curve cryptographic schemes are
based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
1.3 Motivation
Many cryptographic applications are based on elliptic and hyperelliptic curve cryptogra-
phy. Examples include ciphering, deciphering, signing, and verifying a message. Digital
signature can be done in a way opposite to encryption and decryption, in RSA for ex-
ample. The private key d can be used to sign the message S = sign(M,d); then the
3
(a) Symmetric key cryptography.
(b) Public key cryptography.
Figure 1.2: Symmetric key vs. public key cryptography.
other party can use the public key e of the sender to verify the signature of the message
d = verify(S, e,M).
Pairing based cryptography has many cryptographic applications, like the three party
key agreement protocol, identity-based cryptography, and short signatures [4]. The two
party key agreement protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which is a one
round protocol because of the independence of each message [1]. Figure 1.3 shows how to
conduct the three-party two-way key agreement protocol in two-round. The secret key is
abcP and it is intractable given P, aP, bP, cP, abP, bcP, and caP . Pairing can be used to
conduct the three party key agreement protocol in one round as shown in Figure 1.4.
Hyperelliptic curves have applications in asymmetric key cryptography, design of error
correcting codes, and integer factorization algorithms [5]. An elliptic curve is a special case
of a hyperelliptic curve. Compared to elliptic curves, hyperelliptic curves have remained
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less explored, especially for efficient implementation. Therefore, studying how to improve
the algorithms in hyperelliptic curves is of our interest.
In conclusion, improving the basic algorithms in these cryptographic fields and effi-
ciently implementing them are critical to the applications that use them. Since we are
considering software implementation, looking into methods to improve performance is very
helpful.
Figure 1.3: Three-party two-round key agreement protocol.
Figure 1.4: Three-party one-round key agreement protocol.
1.4 Objectives
Elliptic curve cryptography has a shorter key length than RSA for the same security level.
Point addition and point doubling are the major operations of elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy. In [6], a method has been proposed to improve algorithms of point addition and
point doubling. Both algorithms use polynomial multiplication as a major operation. In
5
[7], several polynomial multiplication algorithms have been investigated. Pairing and hy-
perelliptic curve based cryptography has not received as much attention as elliptic curve
cryptography.
In this study, we will extend the idea presented in [6] and use it in pairing computa-
tions and hyperelliptic curves operations to improve their performance. We will investigate
different techniques to improve polynomial multiplication and scalar multiplication in hy-
perelliptic curves.
1.5 Organization
In Chapter 2, the mathematical background needed to understand the proposal is pre-
sented. This chapter introduces abstract algebra, finite field arithmetic, elliptic curve
cryptography, pairing based cryptography, and hyperelliptic curves cryptography. Then,
Chapter 3 presents some mathematical analyses of the methods to improve point addition
and point doubling algorithms. Chapters 4 and 5 explain in detail the software implemen-
tation and the timing results respectively. In Chapter 6, improving the performance of
pairing and hyperelliptic curves is investigated. Finally, a summary of our present work
and possible directions of future research are presented in Chapter 7.
6
Chapter 2
Mathematical Background
In this chapter we introduce the mathematical foundation needed to understand the rest of
the proposal. Specifically, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is taken into consideration.
Refer to [8] for more detailed explanation about ECC.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we give a brief introduction to some abstract
algebra concepts. We then present finite field arithmetic and review some operations like
addition, multiplication, squaring, reduction, and inversion. After that, we focus on elliptic
curve cryptography and look at its definition, point representation and its operations like
point addition, point doubling and scalar multiplication. Next, we give brief introduction
to pairing based cryptography. Finally, we give a brief overview of hyperelliptic curves.
2.1 Abstract Algebra
In this section, we look at concepts from abstract algebra necessary to understand ECC.
Specifically, we review groups and fields.
2.1.1 Groups
An abelian group (G, ∗) is a set G with a binary operation ∗ : G × G → G satisfying the
following properties
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• (Associativity) a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G.
• (Existence of an identity) e ∈ G and a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a for all a ∈ G.
• (Existence of inverses) for each a ∈ G, there exists b ∈ G, a ∗ b = b ∗ a = e.
• (Commutatively) a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ G.
The group might be either an additive group and in this case the negative of a is
denoted as −a or a multiplicative group and the inverse of a is denoted as a−1. The group
is finite if G is a finite set, the number of elements is called the order of G.
Let p be a prime and let e denote the set of integers modulo p, then (Fp,+) is a
finite additive group of order p and its additive identity element is 0. Let F∗p denote the
nonzero set of elements in Fp, then (F
∗
p, ·) is a finite multiplicative group of order p − 1
with multiplicative identity of 1. If G is a finite multiplicative group of order n and g ∈ G,
the smallest positive integer t such that gt = 1 is called the order of g; such a t always
exists and it divides n. The set 〈g〉 = gi : 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1 of all powers of g is a cyclic
subgroup of G generated by g. In the case additive groups, it is similar but tg = 0 and
〈g〉 = ig : 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. If G has an element g of order n, then G is said to be cyclic group
and g is the generator of G.
2.1.2 Fields
Fields are abstractions of similar other number systems like rational (Q), real (R), or com-
plex (C) number systems and their basic properties. They are composed of a set F with
two operations: addition (+) and multiplication (·) such that the following properties are
satisfied:
• (F,+) is an abelian group with an additive identity (0).
• (F\0, ·) is an abelian group with a multiplicative identity (1).
• The distributive law holds: (a+ b) · c = a · c+ b · c for all a, b, c ∈ F.
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The field is said to be finite if F is finite. So, the triple (Fp,+, ·) is a finite field
denoted as Fp. Subtraction can be defined in terms of addition. Assuming a, b ∈ F, then
a− b = a+ (−b), where −b is the negative of b such that b+ (−b) = 0. Similarly, division
can be defined in terms of multiplication, so a/b = a · b−1 where b−1 is the inverse of b such
that b · b−1 = 1.
Let p be a prime number. If addition and multiplication are performed over integers
modulo p, then it is a finite field of order p denoted by Fp. Reduction modulo p for
any integer a can be done by taking a mod p and the result is the remainder r where
0 ≤ r ≤ p− 1 obtained upon dividing a by p.
If the order is of the form 2m, then the field is binary. Polynomials can be used to
represent the field where coefficients are in the field F2 and the degree is at most m− 1.
F2m = am−1zm−1 + am−2zm−2 + . . .+ a2z2 + a1z + a0 : ai ∈ {0, 1}
Addition of two field elements is done by addition modulo 2 of the corresponding
coefficients. Field multiplication is done by polynomial multiplication modulo an irreducible
polynomial of degree m. The latter cannot be represented as a product of other binary
polynomials each of degree less than m.
When the order is pm, where p is a prime and m ≥ 2, the following equation generalizes
the polynomial basis representation to the field Fpm .
Fpm = am−1zm−1 + am−2zm−2 + . . .+ a2z2 + a1z + a0 : ai ∈ Fp
We call k to be a subfield of a field K if k is a field with the operators of K and if k
is a subset of K. Also, K is considered an extension field of k. A finite field Fpm has one
subfield for every divisor l of m; its elements are the elements a ∈ Fpm such that apl = a.
Arithmetic operations can be done to each type. These includes addition, multiplication,
squaring, reduction and inversion. We will look at these operations in the binary field since
it is the focus of the proposal.
2.2 Binary Field Arithmetic
This section focuses on the binary field algorithms and their implementation. These
algorithms include addition, multiplication, squaring, reduction and inversion. Before
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describing the algorithms, we need to look at the representation of the field in soft-
ware. Since the field is binary, each bit in the computer system can represent a poly-
nomial coefficient. Assume that the computer is W -bit architecture, and W is a mul-
tiple of 8. Assume also that we have a field F2m , and consider an element in this field
a(z) = am−1zm−1 + . . . + a2z2 + a1z + a0. To represent this element we need just the
vector a = (am−1, . . . , a2, a1, a0); this vector has a length of m bits. Then, we can store
a in software in an array of t W -bit words, where t = dmupslopeW e, in the following way:
A = (A[t− 1], . . . , A[2], A[1], A[0]). A field element representation is shown in Figure 2.1.
The leftmost s bits of A[t− 1] are unused bits, where s = Wt−m. The right most bit of
A[0] is a0.
Figure 2.1: Representation of a ∈ F2m .
Before going into details, we need to look at the notations used in the algorithms.
Assume that we have two W -bit words, U and V ; then the notations used to denote the
operations are the following:
U ⊕ V : bitwise exclusive-or.
U&V : bitwise AND.
U  i : left shift of U by i positions.
U  i : right shift of U by i positions.
2.2.1 Addition
Since adding elements in binary fields is done modulo 2, then a bitwise XOR can simply
be used to add two polynomials. Algorithm 2.1 shows how we can add two polynomials in
software.
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Algorithm 2.1 Addition in F2m .
1: procedure PolynomialAdd(a(z), b(z)) . c(z) = a(z) + b(z).
2: for i from 0 to t− 1 do
3: c[i]← A[i]⊕B[i]
4: end for
5: return (c).
6: end procedure
2.2.2 Multiplication
Multiplication can be done in two steps. The first one is to multiply the inputs as polyno-
mials and the second one is to reduce the results modulo f(z). In this section we describe
the multiplication operation. Algorithm 2.2 shows how to multiply two polynomials by
the use of the right-to-left comb method. Note that the notation C{j} is used to represent
the truncation of the upper words starting from word j; so if C = (C[n], . . . , c[2], c[1], c[0])
then C{j} = (C[n], . . . , C[j + 1], C[j]). The inner loop deals with the words and the outer
loop deals with the bit position. In each iteration of the outer loop, i.e. bit position, the
value of B is shifted left by 1 position (multiplied by z).
2.2.3 Squaring
If we have a polynomial a(z) = am−1zm−1 + ...+ a2z2 + a1z + a0 then
a(z)2 = am−1z2m−2 + ...+ a2z4 + a1z2 + a0
So squaring the polynomial results in a polynomial of double the size of the original poly-
nomial. The coefficients is one when the power of z is even or 0. Hence, the coefficients
where the power is odd are zeros. Therefore, we can compute the square of a polynomial
by inserting zeros between every two binary digits as shown in Figure 2.2.
In order to make the squaring faster, one can use a lookup table that converts an 8-bit
polynomial into the corresponding 16-bit polynomial which represents the square of the
input. Algorithm 2.3 shows the polynomial squaring algorithm.
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Algorithm 2.2 Right-to-left comb method for polynomial multiplication.
1: procedure PolynomialMultiply(a(z), b(z)) . c(z) = a(z) · b(z)
2: C ← 0.
3: for k from 0 to W − 1 do
4: for j from 0 to t− 1 do
5: if the kth bit of A[j] is 1 then
6: add B to C{j}
7: end if
8: end for
9: if k 6= (W − 1) then
10: B ← B · z.
11: end if
12: end for
13: return (c).
14: end procedure
Algorithm 2.3 Polynomial Squaring with w = 32.
1: procedure PolynomialSquaring(a(z)) . c(z) = a(z)2
2: Precomputation. For each byte d = (d7, . . . , d1, d0), compute the 16-bit quantity
T (d) = (0, d7, . . . , 0, d1, 0, d0).
3: for i from 0 to t− 1 do
4: Let A[i] = (u3, u2, u1, u0) where each uj is a byte . assuming W is 32 bits.
5: C[2i]← (T (u1), T (u0)), C[2i+ 1]← (T (u3), T (u2)) . look up table of 64
entries.
6: end for
7: return (c)
8: end procedure
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Figure 2.2: Squaring a binary polynomial a(z) = am−1zm−1 + ...+ a2z2 + a1z + a0.
2.2.4 Reduction
After performing polynomial multiplication or squaring, the resultant polynomial is one of
degree at most 2m− 2. Therefore, a reduction is needed such that the result is an element
in the field of degree at most m− 1. The reduction polynomial f(z) is of degree m.
We can write f(z) = zm + r(z) where r(z) is a binary polynomial of degree at most
m− 1. In order to reduce c(z) of degree 2m− 2, the following observation is used:
c(z) = c2m−2z2m−2 + · · ·+ cmzm + cm−1zm−1 + · · ·+ c1z + c0
≡ (c2m−2zm−2 + . . .+ cm)r(z) + cm−1zm−1 + . . .+ c1z + c0
This is because r(z) ≡ zm where we equate the reduction polynomial to 0. Then zm can
be taken as a common factor and replaced by r(z). Algorithm 2.4 shows how to perform
modular reduction one bit at a time.
Faster reduction can be achieved if NIST reduction polynomials are used. These are
either trinomial or pentanomial. So in order to reduce the bits with order greater than
m− 1, they need to be added (XORed) a number of times to the polynomial with proper
shifts. Assume we need to reduce the NIST polynomial modulo f(z) = z233 + z74 + 1;
so m = 233. Also assume that W = 32; hence t = 8. The word C[10] represents the
polynomial c351z
351 + . . . + c321z
321 + c320z
320. It can be written in terms of lower degrees
as follows:
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Algorithm 2.4 Modular reduction (one bit at a time).
1: procedure ModulareReduction(c(z), f(z)) . c(z) is a binary polynomial of
degree at most 2m− 2
2: . f(z) = zm + r(z)
3: Precomputation. Compute uk(z) = z
kr(z), 0 ≤ k ≤ W − 1.
4: for i from 2m− 2 downto m do
5: if ci = 1 then
6: Let j ← b(i−m)/W c and k ← (i−m)−Wj.
7: C{j} ← C{j}+ uk(z).
8: end if
9: end for
10: return (C[t− 1], . . . , C[1], C[0]).
11: end procedure
z320 ≡ z161 + z87 mod f(z)
z321 ≡ z162 + z88 mod f(z)
...
z351 ≡ z192 + z118 mod f(z)
The above congruences has two columns in the right hand side. In order to reduce
C[10], one can add (XOR) it two times with its rightmost bit added to bits 161 and 87.
Figure 2.3 shows how this can be performed.
Figure 2.3: Reducing the 32-bit word C[10] modulo f(z) = z233 + z74 + 1.
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This can work for all reduction polynomials recommended by NIST in [9]:
f(z) = z163 + z7 + z3 + 1
f(z) = z233 + z74 + 1
f(z) = z283 + z12 + z7 + z5 + 1
f(z) = z409 + z87 + 1
f(z) = z571 + z10 + 1.
2.2.5 Inversion
Inversion can be done based on the Euclidean algorithm for polynomials. Assuming that
a is a binary polynomial, the inverse of an element a ∈ F2m is g ∈ F2m such that ag ≡ 1
mod f . Assume that b is also a binary polynomial, then gcd(a, b) = gcd(b − ca, a) for all
binary polynomials c. Assume that f is an irreducible reduction polynomial of degree m
and a is a binary polynomial of degree m − 1, therefore gcd(a, f) = 1. If we can write a
polynomial ag+ fh = 1 where g and h are binary polynomials. Then ag = 1 and g = a−1.
Algorithm 2.5 shows the inversion algorithm.
Algorithm 2.5 Extended Euclidean algorithm based inversion in F2m .
1: procedure PolynomialInverse(a) . a is nonzero polynomial of degree at most
m− 1.
2: u← a, v ← f .
3: g1 ← 1, g2 ← 0.
4: while u 6= 1 do
5: j ← deg(u)− deg(v).
6: if j < 0 then
7: u↔ v, g1 ↔ g2, j ← −j.
8: end if
9: u← u+ zjv.
10: g1 ← g1 + zjg2.
11: end while
12: return g1.
13: end procedure
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2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Koblitz [10] and Miller [11] independently proposed the use of elliptic curves over finite
fields to design cryptographic schemes. This section covers the basics of ECC which in-
clude its definition, point representation, and its basic algorithms for point doubling, point
addition and point multiplication. We finally look at the use of NAF representation and
look at the window based NAF point multiplication.
2.3.1 Definition
An elliptic curve E over a field K is defined by an equation called Weierstrass equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
The coefficients of E must be in the field a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K and the discriminant of E
must be nonzero ∆ 6= 0. Discriminant ∆ is defined as ∆ = −d22d8−8d43−27d62+9d2d4d6,
where d2 = a1
2 + 4a2, d4 = 2a4 + a1a3, d6 = a3
2 + 4a6, and d8 = a1
2a6 + 4a2a6 − a1a32a4 +
a2a3
2 − a42. If L is an extension field of K, then the set of L-rational points on E is:
E(L) = {(x, y) ∈ L× L : y2 + a1xy + a3y − x3 − a2x2 − a4x− a6 = 0} ∪ {∞}
where ∞ is the point at infinity.
2.3.2 ECC vs. RSA
Table 2.1 shows the key size of Elliptic curve and RSA cryptosystems for equivalent security
levels. Generally, ECC requires shorter key sizes. As the security level goes higher the
difference of key size between ECC and RSA becomes more significant. This shows the
importance of using elliptic curve cryptography, especially for mobile applications and
embedded systems.
2.3.3 Group law
The chord-and-tangent rule for point addition and point doubling in E(K) is shown in
Figure 2.4. The set of points in E(K) with (∞) forms an abelian group. The addition rule
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Table 2.1: Key sizes for ECC and RSA for equivalent security levels.
Security Level 80 112 128 192 256
ECC 160 224 256 384 512
RSA 1024 2048 3072 8192 15360
of two distinct points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) on the curve can be done by drawing
a line from P to V and this line will intersects the curve at a third point. The reflection
of this point about the x-axis is the result R as shown in Figure 2.4a. In the case of point
doubling a tangent is drawn at P and then a reflection of the intersection point is the result
R as shown in Figure 6.2.
(a) Addition: P +Q = R. (b) Doubling: 2P = R
Figure 2.4: Addition and doubling of elliptic curve points
The Weierstrass equation can be simplified for non-supersingular curve E/F2m : y
2 +
xy = x3 + ax2 + b. The following are the group laws:
• Identity. P +∞ =∞+ P = P for all P ∈ E(Fm2 ).
• Negatives. If P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fm2 ), then −P = (x, x+ y) ∈ F2m and P − P =∞.
• Point addition. Let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(F2m) and Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E(F2m), Then
P +Q = (x3, y3), where x3 = λ
2 +λ+ x1 + x2 + a and y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1 with
λ = (y1 + y2)/(x1 + x2).
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• Point doubling. Let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(F2m), where P 6= −P . Then 2P = (x3, y3),
where x3 = λ
2+λ+x1+x2+a and x3 = λ
2+λ+a = x1
2+ b
x12
and y3 = x1
2+λx3+x3
where λ = x1 + y1/x1.
2.3.4 Point representation
The coordinates (x, y) considered in 2.3.3 are affine coordinates. In the same section point
addition and point doubling are shown using affine coordinates. Field inversion and mul-
tiple field multiplication are needed for point addition or doubling when affine coordinates
are used. Inversion free algorithms can be implemented with the use of Projective Coordi-
nates [8]. Projective coordinates consists of more than two terms in their coordinates e.g.,
(x, y, z). Equivalence relation of two projective coordinates is defined as follows:
(X1, Y1, Z1) ∼ (X2, Y2, Z2) if X1 = λcX2, Z1 = λdY2, Z1 = λZ2 for some λ ∈ K∗. The
projective points where Z = 0 is called the line at infinity. The one-to-one correspondence
between affine and projective coordinates can be achieved by having Z = 1 and in fact
it is the point (X/Zc, Y/Zd, 1). If c = 1 and d = 1 then this is called standard projective
coordinates and the point at infinity is (0 : 1 : 0).
2.3.5 Point operations
The curve y2 = x3 + ax + b becomes Y 2Z = X3 + aX2Z + bZ3 when using projective
coordinates. Let P = (XP , YP , ZP ) and Q = (XQ, YQ, ZQ) are the points to add, and
R = (XR, YR, ZR) is the resultant point. Point addition and point doubling algorithms of
projective coordinates in this curve are presented in [12]. Algorithm 2.6 shows that point
addition algorithm in standard projective coordinates.
Algorithm 2.7 shows how can point doubling algorithm be done. Note that in both -
point doubling and point addition - algorithms use addition which is essentially an XOR
(⊕) in addition to multiplication and squaring where the binary field multiplication and
squaring algorithms explained earlier are used.
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Algorithm 2.6 Point Addition in standard projective coordinates.
1: procedure PointAdd(P,Q)
2: if P =∞ then
3: return Q.
4: end if
5: if Q =∞ then
6: return P .
7: end if
8: S1 ← YP · ZQ.
9: S2 ← XP · ZQ.
10: A← S1 + ZP · YQ.
11: B ← S2 + ZP ·XQ.
12: S3 ← A+B.
13: C ← B2.
14: D ← ZP · ZQ.
15: E ← B · C.
16: F ← (A · S3 + b · C) ·D + E.
17: XR ← B · F .
18: YR ← C · (A · S2 +BS1) + S3F .
19: ZR ← E ·D.
20: return R.
21: end procedure
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Algorithm 2.7 Point doubling in standard projective coordinate.
1: procedure PointDouble(P )
2: if Q =∞ then
3: return Q.
4: end if
5: A← XP 2.
6: B ← A+ YP · ZP .
7: C ← XP · ZP .
8: BC ← B + C.
9: D ← C2.
10: E ← B ·BC + b ·D.
11: XR ← C · E.
12: YR ← BC · E + A2 · C.
13: ZR ← C ·D.
14: return R.
15: end procedure
2.3.6 Point multiplication
Consider the problem Q = kP where P is a point and k is an integer. The result Q is
another point on the elliptic curve K over the field F2m , this is called point multiplication or
scalar multiplication. The problem to find k given P and Q is called elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem which is believed to be intractable, in general. Algorithm 2.8 shows the
scalar multiplication algorithm. It is basically double and add algorithm. The algorithms
described above for point doubling and point addition can be used.
NAF representation and window method
If we can rewrite k such that ki ∈ {0,±1} and no two consecurtvie digits ki are not zero,
then the result is called non-adjacent form (NAF). Therefore, when building the point
multiplication algorithm and using NAF representation, we subtract the value of P from
the result in case the value of ki is −1. The idea could be extended to a width-w NAF. In
this case, ki is an odd integer such that |ki| < 2w−1 and no two consecutive nonzero digits.
In this case, we add or subtract multiple of the point according to the value of ki digit.
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Algorithm 2.8 Right-to-left binary method for point multiplication.
1: procedure PointMultiply(k, P ) . k = (kt−1, . . . , k1, k0)2, P ∈ E(F2m).
2: Q←∞.
3: for i from 0 to t− 1 do
4: if ki = 1 then
5: Q← Q+ P .
6: end if
7: P ← 2P .
8: end for
9: return Q.
10: end procedure
Sliding window method uses the same NAF representation but it traces multiple digits to
form an odd positive or negative number and then add or subtract multiple of the point.
To subtract a point you add its negative so if we have P = (x, y). Then, −P = (x, x+ y).
Algorithm 2.9 shows how we can get the NAF representation of an integer. Algorithm 2.10
shows the sliding window point multiplication algorithm.
2.4 Pairing
In this section, pairing used in cryptography is briefly reviewed. First, a definition of
bilinear pairing is given. Then, Tate pairing is discussed. Finally, it is shown how bilinear
pairings can be satisfied from the Tate pairing. Refer to [4] for more information.
2.4.1 Bilinear pairing
Let G1 = 〈P 〉 be an additively-written group of order n with∞ as identity. Also let GT be
a multiplicatively-written group of order n and identity 1. A bilinear pairing on (G1, GT )
is a map eˆ : G1 ×G1 → GT that satisfy these conditions:
• (bilinearity) For all R, S, T ∈ G1, eˆ(R + S, T ) = eˆ(R, T )eˆ(S, T ) and eˆ(R, S + T ) =
eˆ(R, S)eˆ(R, T ).
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Algorithm 2.9 Computing the NAF of a positive integer.
1: procedure GetNAF(k) . k is a positive Integer.
2: i← 0.
3: while k ≥ 1 do
4: if k is odd then
5: ki ← 2− (k mod (4)).
6: k ← k − ki.
7: else
8: k ← 0.
9: i← i+ 1.
10: end if
11: end while
12: return (ki−1, ki−2, . . . , k1, k0).
13: end procedure
• (non-degeneracy) eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1.
• (computability) eˆ can be computed efficiently.
2.4.2 Tate pairing
Let E[n] be the set of all points P ∈ E(K) where K is the closure of K and K = Fq. Let
µn denote order-n subgroup of Fq
∗. Then, the Tate pairing is a map e : E[n] × E[n] →
µn which can be defined in the following way: Let P,Q ∈ E[n] and fP is a function
such that div(fP ) = n(P ) − n(∞) where div is the divisor. Let R ∈ E[n] such that
R /∈ {∞, P,−Q,P − Q} and DQ = (Q + R) − (R) and let DQ = (Q + R) − (R). Then,
e(P,Q) = fP (DQ)
(qk−1)/n = (fP (Q+R)
fP (R)
)(q
k−1)/n.
2.5 Hyperelliptic Curves
Hyperelliptic curves (HEC) are a generalization of elliptic curves. If the genus of a Hyper-
elliptic curve g = 1 then the curve is an elliptic curve. For every genus g ≥ 1, there is a
hyperelliptic curve. In this section, a short introduction to hyperelliptic curve is provided.
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Algorithm 2.10 Point multiplication using sliding window method.
1: procedure SlidingWindowPointMultiply(P, kNaf)
2: Compute Pi = iP for i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , 2(2w − (−1)w)/3− 1}
3: Q←∞, i← l − 1.
4: while i ≥ 0 do
5: if ki = 0 then
6: t← 1, u← 0.
7: else
8: find the largest t ≤ w such that u← (ki, . . . , ki−t+1) is odd.
9: end if
10: Q← 2tQ.
11: if u > 0 then
12: Q← Q+ Pu.
13: else if u < 0 then
14: Q← Q− P−u.
15: end if
16: i← i− t.
17: end while
18: return (Q).
19: end procedure
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Menezes, Wu and Zuccherato report gives an excellent introduction to hyperelliptic curves
[5].
A hyperelliptic curve C of genus g over the field K satisfy the following equation
C : v2 + h(u)v = f(u) in K[u, v],
where h(u) ∈ k[u] is a polynomial of degree at most g and f(u) ∈ K[u] is a monic
polynomial of degree 2g + 1. Assuming that K is the algebraic closure of K, then there is
no solution (u, v) ∈ K × K that satisfies the equation v2 + h(u)v = f(u) and its partial
derivative equation (with respect to v and u): 2v + h(u) = 0 and h′(u)v − f ′(u) = 0. If a
solution exists, then this is called a singular point.
Assume that L is an extension field of K. Then, the set of L-rational points on C,
denoted C(L), is the set of all points P = (x, y) ∈ L × L that satisfy the hyperelliptic
curve equation in addition to the point at infinity ∞. The opposite of P is the point
P˜ = (x,−y − h(x)). The point is special if P = P˜ .
An example of hyperelliptic curve of genus g = 2 and h(u) = 0 is C1 : v
2 = u5 + u4 +
4u3 + 3u+ 3. Another example where g = 2, h(u) = u and f(u) = u5 + 5u4 + 6u2 + u+ 3
is C2 : v
2 + uv = u5 + 5u4 + 6u2 + u+ 3 over the finite field Z7 then the Z7-rational points
are C(Z7) = {∞, (1, 1), (1, 5), (2, 2), (2, 3), (5, 3), (5, 6), (6, 4)}.
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Chapter 3
Improved Polynomial Multiplication
and Point Addition/Doubling
Algorithms
In this chapter, we present a survey of the major cryptographic algorithms related to our
work. The first section surveys several polynomial multiplication algorithms. The second
section highlights the improved point addition and point doubling algorithms in binary
elliptic curves.
3.1 Polynomial Multiplication Algorithms
In this section, we first introduce the Karatsuba Algorithm, more specifically, the 2-way
split (K2W) algorithm. After that a number of 3-way algorithms are investigated. Most
of the material of this section is based on the work in [7] [13]. Next, we look at a general
methodology to design a 3-way split algorithm. Then, the Karatsuba 3-way split (K3W)
formulæ are presented. After that, we show an improvement on the Karatsuba 3-way
(IK3W) formulæ. Then, Bernstein’s 3-way split (B3W) formulæ are highlighted. Finally,
the field extension based 3-way split formulæ (FE3W) are presented.
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3.1.1 Karatsuba (K2W) multiplication
The idea of Karatsuba polynomial multiplication is to split the polynomial in two half-
size polynomials and recursively call the algorithm in order to reduce the complexity
of multiplication [14]. Assume that we have the following two polynomials, A(X) =∑m−1
i=0 AiX
i and B(X) =
∑m−1
i=0 BiX
i. The polynomials can be rewritten in the fol-
lowing way: A(X) = A1X + A0 and B(z) = B1X + B0 (after substituting Y = X
m/2
and then replacing Y with X). The following auxiliary variables are needed: D0, D1,
and D0,1, where D0 = A0 · B0, D1 = A1 · B1, and D0,1 = (A0 + A1) · (B0 + B1). Then
we can compute the polynomial C(X) = A(X)B(X) by the following reconstruction:
C(z) = D1X
2 + (D0,1 −D0 −D1)X +D0.
3.1.2 Sketching 3-way split multiplication algorithm
Formulas that consist of multi-evaluation and interpolation (Toom-Cook like [15] [16]) can
be used to design 3-way split algorithms. Assume that A(X) and B(X) are polynomials of
degree n−1 inR[X] whereR is a ring and n is a power of 3. We can split these polynomials
into three parts: A = A0+A1X
n/3+A2X
2n/3 and B = B0+B1X
n/3+B2X
2n/3. The degrees
of Ai and Bi are both n/3 − 1. By substituting Xn/3 by Y , we can rewrite A and B as:
A = A0 + A1Y + A2Y
2 and B = B0 +B1Y +B2Y
2. Since A and B are both polynomials
of degree 2 in terms of Y , then their product C is of degree 4 and it has five terms.
Therefore, polynomial C can be determined when we compute its value at five points. Let
the points be α1, . . . , α4 ∈ R and α5 =∞; then the multi-evaluation can be done term by
term for A(αi) and B(αi) and the product can be computed as C(αi) at the five points.
Then, interpolation can be used to compute C(Y ) by employing the Lagrange polynomial
Li(Y ) =
∏4
j=1,j 6=i
Y−αi
αi−αj for i = 1, . . . , 4 and L∞ =
∏4
i=1(Y −αi). Finally, to compute C(Y ),
the following formula can be used: C(Y ) =
∑4
i=1C(αi)Li(Y ) + C(∞)L∞(Y ). To get the
result in terms of X, Y is substituted by Xn/3.
3.1.3 The Karatsuba 3-way split (K3W) formulæ
Assume the same A(X) and B(X) of degree n− 1 considered in the previous section but
the field in this case is F2[X]. However, in this field, there are only two points, 0 and 1, to
26
be used in multi-evaluation. The Winograd method [17] suggested the replacement of the
two missing points by multiplication modulo Y 2 +Y + 1. So the multi-evaluation is as the
following:

C(0) = A(0)B(0) = A0B0,
C(1) = A(1)B(1) = (A0 + A1 + A2)(B0 +B1 +B2),
C(Y ) = (A0 + A2 + (A1 + A2)Y )(B0 +B2 + (B1 +B2)Y ) mod (Y
2 + Y + 1),
C(∞) = A(∞)B(∞) = A2B2.
To perform the multiplication modulo Y 2+Y +1, Winograd used the Karatsuba formula
which needs 3 multiplications (A0+A1)(B0+B1), (A1+A2)(B1+B2), and (A0+A2)(B0+B2).
The Chinese remainder theorem can be used for the reconstruction. The following are the
formulæ used for the recursive products.

P0 = A0B0
P1 = A1B1
P2 = A2B2
P3 = (A0 + A1)(B0 +B1)
P4 = (A1 + A2)(B1 +B2)
P5 = (A0 + A2)(B0 +B2)
The following formulæ can be used for reconstruction.
R0 = P0 + P1
R1 = P3 +R0
R2 = P0 + P1 + P2 + P5
R3 = P1 + P2 + P4
C = P0 +R0X
n/3 +R1X
2n/3 +R2X
3n/3 + P2X
4n/3
3.1.4 Improved Karatsuba 3-way (IK3W) formulæ
The reconstruction process can be re-arranged to save some computations to the 3-way
algorithm presented in the previous section. Assume we have the same A and B polyno-
mials used in the previous section which are split in three parts. The product formulæ can
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be used in a similar fashion to the 3-way formulæ. The following expression is used in the
previous section for the reconstruction:
C = P0 + (P0 +P1 +P3)X
n/3 + (P0 +P1 +P2 +P5)X
2n/3 + (P1 +P2 +P4)X
3n/3 +P2X
4n/3
The above expression can be rewritten in the following way:
C = (P0 +X
n/3P1 +X
2n/3P2)(1 +X
n/3 +X2n/3) + P3X
n/3 + P5X
2n/3 + P4X
3n/3
We can define R0 = P0 +X
n/3P1 +X
2n/3P2 and R1 = R0(1 +X
n/3 +X2n/3). Then we
have C in terms of Pi and Ri as C = R1 + P3X
n/3 + P5X
2n/3 + P4X
3n/3. Therefore the
product formulæ are shown below:

P0 = A0B0
P1 = A1B1
P2 = A2B2
P3 = (A0 + A1)(B0 +B1)
P4 = (A1 + A2)(B1 +B2)
P5 = (A0 + A2)(B0 +B2)
The reconstruction formulæ are as follows:
R0 = P0 +X
n/3P1 +X
2n/3
R1 = R0(1 +X
n/3 +X2n/3)
C = R1 + P3X
n/3 + P5X
2n/3 + P4X
3n/3
3.1.5 Bernstein’s (B3W) formulæ
Multi-evaluation and interpolation are also used in the Bernstein algorithm [18] by evalu-
ating the polynomials at 0, 1, X,X + 1, and∞. So the pairwise product of the evaluations
of A(Y ) and B(Y ) are as follows:
P0 = A0B0
P1 = (A0 + A1 + A2)(B0 +B1 +B2)
P2 = (A0 + A1X + A2X
2)(B0 +B1X +B2X
2)
P3 = ((A0 + A1 + A2) + (A1X + A2X
2))× ((B0 +B1 +B2) + (B1X +B2X2))
P4 = A2B2
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The following expressions are proposed by Bernstein for reconstruction:
U = P0 + (P0 + P1)X
V = P2 + (P2 + P3)(X
n/3 +X)
C = U + P4(X
4n/3 +Xn/3) + (U+V+P4(X
4+X))(X2n/3+Xn/3)
X2+X
The explicit computation of Bernstein is composed of three parts: multi-evaluation,
product and reconstruction. The multi-evaluation formulæ are:
M1 = A0 + A1 + A2, M
′
1 = B0 +B1 +B2
M2 = A1X + A2X
2, M
′
2 = B1X +B2X
2
M3 = A0 +M2, M
′
3 = B0 +M
′
2
M4 = M1 +M2, M
′
4 = M
′
1 +M
′
2
The product formulæ are shown below:

P0 = A0B0
P1 = M1M
′
1
P2 = M3M
′
3
P3 = M4M
′
4
P4 = A2B2
The reconstruction formulæ are as follows:
S = P2 + P3
U = P0 + (P0 + P1)X
n/3
V = P2 + S(X
n/3 +X)
W = U + V + P4(X
4 +X)
W
′
= W/(X2 +X)
W
′′
= W ′(X2n/3 +Xn/3)
C = U + P4(X
4n/3 +Xn/3) +W
′′
3.1.6 Field extension based 3-way (FE3W) formulæ
In the previous section, we have seen that Bernstein makes the evaluation at X and X + 1
as the two extra points other than 0 and 1 values available in F2 in addition to ∞ point.
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In [7], as an alternative method, field extension F4 = F2[α]/(α
2 + α+ 1) has been used. In
this case, the polynomial can be evaluated at 0, 1, α, α + 1, and ∞. As a result, we have
the following recursive multiplication:
P0 = A0B0 in F2[X]
P1 = (A0 + A1 + A2)(B0 +B1 +B2) in F2[X]
P2 = (A0 + A2 + α(A1 + A2))(B0 +B2 + α(B1 +B2)) in F4[X]
P3 = (A0 + A1 + α(A1 + A2))(B0 +B1 + α(B1 +B2)) in F4[X]
P4 = A2B2 in F2[X]
The Lagrange interpolation can be used to compute the reconstruction C = A× B as
shown below:
C = (P0 +X
n/3P4)(1 +X
n) + (P1 + (1 + α)(P2 + P3))(X
n/3 +X2n/3 +Xn)
The following are the formulæ for the multi-evaluation, which is similar in both cases
in F2 and in F4. 
M1 = A0 + A1, M
′
1 = B0 +B1
M2 = A1 + A2, M
′
2 = B1 +B2
M3 = αM2, M
′
3 = αM
′
2
M4 = M1, M
′
4 = M
′
1 +M
′
3
M5 = M4 +M2, M
′
5 = M
′
4 +R
′
2
M6 = M1 + A2, M
′
6 = M
′
1 +B2
The following are the product formulæ

P0 = A0B0
P1 = M6M
′
6
P2 = M5M
′
5
P3 = M4M
′
4
P4 = A2B2
The following are the reconstruction formulæ in F4:
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
U1 = P2 + P3
U2 = αU1
U3 = (1 + α)U1
U4 = P1 + U3
U5 = U4(X
n/3 +X2n/3 +X3n/3)
U6 = P0 +X
n/3P4
U7 = U6(1 +X
n)
C = U7 + U5 +X
nU2 + P2X
2n/3 + P3X
n/3
If a = a0+a1α and b = b0+b1α, then we can denote [a+b]const = a0+b0. The following
formulæ show the reconstruction in F2:
U1 = P2 + P3
U2 = [αU1]const
U3 = [(1 + α)U1]const
U4 = [P1 + U3]const
U5 = [U4(X
n/3 +X2n/3 +X3n/3)]const
U6 = [P0 +X
n/3P4]const
U7 = [U6(1 +X
n)]const
C = [U7 + U5 +X
nU2 + P2X
2n/3 + P3X
n/3]const
3.1.7 Reducing two multiplications to one F4[X] multiplication
The field extension 3-way split algorithm presented in the previous section can be used to
replace two F2 multiplications AB and AC such that A,B,C ∈ F2[X] by one F4 multipli-
cation. We can write P = A(B + αC) = P0 + αP1, this results in P0 = AB and P1 = AC.
This shows some potential advantage since it is faster to use a single multiplication in F4[X]
than two multiplications in F2[X]. The use of a single multiplication in F4[X] works here as
simultaneous finite field operations which include the products AB and AC in F2[X]. This
kind of computation exists in elliptic curve point addition and point doubling algorithms.
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3.2 ECC Algorithms
As mentioned in Chapter 2 the Weierstrass form of elliptic curve over F2 is y
2 + xy =
x3 + a2x
2 + a6 where a2, a6 ∈ F2n and a6 6= 0. A point (x, y) on an elliptic curve can be
expressed as (X, Y, Z) where x = X/Z and y = Y/Z. The projective representation of the
curve is Y 2Z + XY Z = X3 + a2X
2Z + a6Z
3. This equation of the curve is used in the
following discussion.
3.2.1 Point addition
If we want to add two points P = (X1, Y1, Z1) and Q = (X2, Y2, Z2), then their addition is
R = P +Q = (X3, Y3, Z3). The following are the formulæ for point addition [12]. We will
call this point addition conventional point addition algorithm in the rest of the proposal.
S1 = Y1Z2, S2 = X1Z2, A = S1 + Z1Y2,
B = S2 + Z1X2, S3 = A+B, C = B
2
D = Z1Z2, E = BC, F = (AS3 + a2C)D + E
X3 = BF, Y3 = C(AS2 +BS1) + S3F, Z3 = ED
In the previous set of formulæ, we have Z2 as common for the products S1 = Y1Z2 and
S2 = X1Z2. Moreover, Z1 is common for the products Z1Y2 and Z1X2. A common operand
A is for AS3 and AS2. (AS3 +a2C)D and ED have D in common. The common term F is
there for FB and FS3. The following formula can be used as new point addition formulæ
[6]. We will call these forumulas CANH point addition (after the last names of the authors
of [6]: Cenk, M., Alrefai, A. S., Negre, C. and Hasan, M. A.)
T1 = Z2(Y1 + αX1), T2 = T1,0, T3 = T1,1,
T4 = Z1(Y2 + αX2), T5 = T4,0, T6 = T4,1,
T7 = T2 + T5, T8 = T3 + T6, T9 = T7 + T8, T10 = T
2
8 ,
T11 = Z1Z2, T12 = T8T10, T13 = T7(T9 + αT3),
T14 = T13,0, T15 = T13,1, T16 = T14 + a2T10,
T17 = T11(T16 + αT12), T18 = T17,0, T19 = Z3 = T17,1,
T20 = T18 + T12, T21 = T20(T8 + αT9), T22 = T21,0,
T23 = T21,1, X3 = T22, Y3 = T10(T15 + T8T2) + T23.
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3.2.2 Point doubling
The best known formulæ for point doubling as presented in [12] are shown below. We call
these formulæ conventional point doulbling:.
{
A = X21 , B = A+ Y1Z1, C = X1Z1, D = B + C, E = C
2,
F = BD + a2E, X3 = CF, Y3 = DF + A
2C, Z3 = CE.
The products Y1Z1 and X1Z1 have Z1 in common. CF and DF have F in common.
Moreover, A2C and CE have C as a common operand. The following are the formulæ
after applying the modifications [6]. These formulæ are called in this proposal CANH
point doubling after the names of the authors in [6].

T1 = X
2
1 , T2 = Z1(Y1 + αX1), T3 = T2,0, T4 = T2,1, T5 = T1 + T3, T6 = T4 + T5,
T7 = T
2
4 , T8 = T5T6 + a2T7, T9 = T8(T4 + αT6), T10 = T9,0, T11 = T9,1,
T12 = T
2
1 , T13 = T4(T12 + αT7), T14 = T13,0, T15 = T13,1,
X3 = T10, Y3 = T11 + T14, Z3 = T15.
3.3 Related Work
In [19], different finite fields for elliptic curve cryptosystems are compared. They found that
the use of optimized extension fields (OEFs) produces greater performance. An efficient
algorithm for multiplication in F2m is described in [20]. The authors proposed a comb
method with the use of a window as an improvement over the shift and add method.
An excellent survey of the techniques used to multiply elements in different rings is
presented in [21]. This covers Karatsuba and Toom multiplications and different tricks
for performing multiplication. Their paper focuses both on multiplying large integers and
finding the product of polynomial over a commutative ring. In [22], a proposed method to
improve splitting of input is described. This method improves the theoretical XOR gate
delay of the Karatsuba multiplier. In [23], the toeplitz matrix-vector products and coor-
dinate transformation techniques are utilized to achieve a subquadratic space complexity
parallel multiplier.
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Bernstein proposed an optimization of Karatsuba forumula for binary polynomial mul-
tiplication in [18] by rearranging the reconstruction part in two recursions of the formula.
A generalization of this approach is propsed by Negre in [24], who extended his work in
[25] to three-way split formula. His work improves over the best known space complexity
of [7] while having the same time complexity as the best known approach in [22].
The work in [26] studies the optimization effects of optimizing software implementa-
tion on small binary field arithmetic. Their implementation smooths the performance of
binary fields to better resemble theoretical results. They noted that their results might
require the development of new explicit formulæ for arithmetic on elliptic and hyperelliptic
curves. The use of the vector instruction set in the software implementation of binary field
arithmetic is described in [27]. Their representation uses extensively the parallel lookup
instruction introduced in desktop platforms which expedite the implementation of crypto-
graphic algorithms. For large finite fields GF(2n), the work of Luo J. et al. studies efficient
software implementation techniques as well as present new optimization methodology [28].
The reader might refer to [29] for superb article that survey different techniques for imple-
menting finite field arithmetic in software. The work of A. Reyhani-Masoleh in [30] present
efficient algorithms for field multiplication in normal basis.
The work of Lopez and Dahab in [31] proposes an optimized version of the work in [32]
for doing fast scalar multiplication without precomputation. Higuchi and Takagi proposed
in [33] a fast addition algorithm using projective coordinates. Their algorithm improves
over the Lopez and Dahab algorithm proposed in [34] by the use of the same coordinate
system.
A study of software implementation of NIST recommended elliptic curves is presented
in [35]. Their results show that projective coordinates are better than affine coordinates
due to the use of costly inversion. The use of Koblitz curves is better than random curves
in their implementation. The work of Bernstein and Lange [36] studies how to optimize
single-scalar multiplication in elliptic curves. This includes how many points are needed for
precomputation in sliding window computation of scalar multiplication and other issues.
The use of instruction set extension to speed up arithmetic over binary fields is dis-
cussed in [37] and [38]. For an excellent survey for fast hardware implementation of elliptic
curve cryptography, the interested reader might refer to [39]. In [40] the authors described
the design of a crypto-processor for ECC. Their design present high performance imple-
mentation that utilizes low area. The work in [41] presents the use of the parallelism in
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residue number system to build a fast point multiplier in elliptic curve cryptography.
Wollinger et al. [42] focused on embedded processors in their study of elliptic curve
cryptography and hyperelliptic curve cryptography and how it is affected by different ar-
chitectures, processor types and resources. They improved the HECC algorithms.
3.4 Summary
The use of fast polynomial multiplication algorithms helps improve elliptic curve operations
that depend on them. In this chapter, polynomial multiplication formulæ as well as elliptic
curves point addition and point doubling formulæ have been investigated. Recursive mul-
tiplication algorithms depend on splitting the polynomials and dealing with the resulting
smaller size polynomials. The FE3W algorithm can replace two multiplications in the same
field that have a common factor. This idea has been used to improve point addition and
doubling algorithms in elliptic curves, and the formulæ for the improved algorithms have
been shown.
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Chapter 4
Software Implementation
In this chapter, we introduce some algorithms used to develop the elliptic curve point
multiplication to generate the results. More specifically, we discuss the implementation of
2-way and 3-way split algorithms for polynomial multiplication. These include the K2W
[14], K3W [14], IK3W [7], B3W [18] and FE3W [7]. Also we discuss the implementation
of the algorithms related to elliptic curve like point doubling, point addition and point
multiplication [6].
4.1 Preliminaries
In this section we provide an introduction to software implementation and the development
environment used. Then, we will talk about Big Integer structure that is used in our im-
plementation. After that, the overall view of the program is presented. The description of
polynomial multiplication algorithms are presented next. This is followed by the structure
of the reduction algorithms and then the structure of elliptic curve algorithms. At the end,
other classes implemented are introduced.
4.1.1 Development environment
C] is used as the programming language which is an improvement of C++ programming
language but includes object oriented features like classes and methods. C] is part of .Net
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framework. Visual studio is used as a development environment.
4.1.2 BigInteger
BigInteger structure is part of .Net 4.0 frameworks [43]. This structure accepts integers
of any size. One can use it to perform all the basic operations used in integer. That
includes normal operations like addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division and bit-
wise operations like ORing, ANDing, and eXclusive ORing (XOR). The internal structure
of BigInteger is an array of 32-bit integers. With the availability of this structure, one
needs not to worry about the internal management of bits in this array and how the basic
operation is handled. This makes the implementation of the algorithms a little bit easier.
4.1.3 High level view
Figure 4.1 shows the overall structure of the implementation. The main program is a
class that is used to test the methods and to measure the timing results. Polynomial
multiplication package or the set of classes contains the methods used to perform different
types of polynomial multiplication algorithm. Reduction package contains algorithms to
perform a general reduction algorithm or fast reduction algorithms for specific NIST fields.
Elliptic Curve package contains classes to define elliptic curve points and the methods of
point addition, point doubling and point multiplication.
4.1.4 Structure of polynomial multiplication
We implemented five polynomial multiplication algorithms. These are shown in Figure 4.2.
They are mainly the K2W, K3W, IK3W, B3W and FE3W. Each algorithm is implemented
in a class that extends polynomial multiplication interface. Later in this chapter, we will
describe these algorithms in details.
4.1.5 Structure of reduction
Since our test results focus on NIST recommended curves, we have implemented faster
reduction algorithms for these curves. Figure 4.3 shows the structure of the reduction
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Figure 4.1: General structure of the implementation.
package. A method for general reduction and other reduction methods that work on
elliptic curves: B163, B233, B283, B409 and B571.
4.1.6 Structure of elliptic curve arithmetic
To construct an elliptic curve, a class is built to represent the points. Each point has three
coordinates X, Y, and Z. Figure 4.4 shows the elliptic curve package. ECPoint class has
a method to determine whether the point is infinity (∞). The Elliptic curve class has the
point addition and point doubling methods in addition to point multiplication methods.
4.1.7 Other classes
Some other classes are also built to complete the program. For example, one class is built
to perform the inversion of an element in a field. This is used to convert the point from
projective to affine coordinates in order to test the correctness of our implementation. Also
configuration class is built to generate the table of results of polynomial multiplication of
small numbers.
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Figure 4.2: Structure of polynomial multiplication package.
4.2 Polynomial Multiplication
In this section, detail of implementation of the polynomial multiplication algorithms is
presented. These algorithms include the K2W, K3W, IK3W , B3W and FE3W algorithms.
4.2.1 Polynomial multiplication algorithms
Algorithms of polynomial multiplication considered here are recursive in nature, i.e. a
method inside an algorithm may call the method itself. These algorithms are based on
the idea of splitting, similar to the Karatsuba algorithm reviewed in section 3.1.1. In that
section the polynomial is divided into two subpolynomials. However, 3-way split methods
divide the polynomial into three smaller polynomials.
In general there are five parts of polynomial multiplication algorithm as shown in Figure
4.5. The first one is stop-check in which if the polynomial size is less than a certain threshold
then the check returns the result from a precomputed look up table. The second one is
splitting in which the polynomial is split in two or three smaller polynomials. The third
step is multi-evaluation which makes some operations on the polynomials and generate
temporary variables to be used in the forth step which is product recursive calls. Multi-
evaluation is actually a step to evaluate a number of points on the curve of product of the
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Figure 4.3: Structure of reduction package.
two polynomials. Product recursive calls usually call the same method again, but it uses as
an input the sub-polynomials or the results of multi-evaluation step. The last step, which
is called reconstruction, is the calculation conducted on the results of the recursive calls
to get the resulting polynomial. Reconstruction is originally an interpolation step of the
product results of the points in the curve. Multi-evaluation and reconstruction are known
as Toom-Cook like formulas [7].
4.2.2 Look-up table
Polynomial multiplication over F2 is not a normal multiplication of two integers. It is
actually a carry-less multiplication. The polynomials we are trying to multiply are of large
degree, for example NIST fields go up to 570. Hence the degree of the product is up to
1140. Normal integer structure does not fit to represent polynomials. As a result, we use
BigInteger structure, we described earlier in section 4.1.2, to represent them. Assume that
we have two small polynomials we are trying to multiple A = x2 + x+ 1 and B = x2 + x.
The binary representations of these two polynomials are (111)2 and (110)2 respectively.
These numbers are 7 and 6 in decimal and their radix-ten multiplication is 42. However,
their polynomial multiplication is (x2 + x + 1) · (x2 + x) = x4 + x3 + x2 + x3 + x2 + x =
x4 + x = (10010)2 = (18)10. This example of carry-less multiplication is shown in Figure
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Figure 4.4: Elliptic curve package.
4.6 and it is different than conventional multiplication since the addition is done mod 2 or
XOR (⊕).
One can construct a look-up table (LUT ) using a two dimensional array, where the
rows of the array represent the first input and the columns represent the second input.
The content of the cell in the array is the polynomial multiplication result. Table 4.1 is a
polynomial multiplication look up table of input size up to 3 bits. One can get the result
from the table by inserting the two input as index. For example, to multiply polynomials,
whose decimal representation is 7 and 6, we index the table at row (R = 7) and column
(C = 6) and the result (R = 18), we can write it as LUT (7, 6) = 18.
Table 4.1: Look up table for multiplication up to 3-bit input size.
R\C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
3 0 3 6 5 12 15 10 9
4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
5 0 5 10 15 20 17 30 27
6 0 6 12 10 24 30 20 18
7 0 7 14 9 28 27 18 21
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Figure 4.5: Polynomial multiplication algorithm structure.
4.2.3 Splitting
Since splitting is done in every algorithm, it is worth discussing it in a separate section.
Algorithm 4.1 shows how a polynomial can be split in two subpolynomials using shift and
XOR operations. Similarly, Algorithm 4.2 shows how to split the polynomial in three
subpolynomials.
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Figure 4.6: Carry-less multiplication.
Algorithm 4.1 Splitting into two subpolynomials.
procedure SplitTwo(A, n) . A is the polynomial to be split, n is subpolynomial
length
A1 ← A n.
A0 ← A⊕ (A1  n).
return (A1, A0).
end procedure
4.2.4 The K2W algorithm
In [44], Karatsuba suggested a method of performing multiplication of large integers. We
assume the number of coefficients to be a power of 2. So the two polynomials that we
intend to multiply are split into two halves. These halves can be used as if they were
coefficients. Algorithm 4.3 shows the Karatsuba multiplication. Since the field is binary,
XOR (⊕) is used instead of addition and subtraction. Algorithm 4.3 shows the way it is
implemented. Note that the use of SplitTwo is done in the same way as in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.2 Splitting into three subpolynomials.
procedure ThreeWaySplit(A, n) . A is two input polynomials, n is subpolynomial
length
A2 ← A (n 1). . n 1 is equal to 2 · n
A1 ← (A n)⊕ (A2  n).
A0 ← A⊕ (A2  (n 1))⊕ (A1  n)
return (A2, A1, A0).
end procedure
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One can easily distinguish the degree of polynomial multiplication. The way we measure
the size is by taking the logarithm of the BigInteger input.
Algorithm 4.3 The K2W polynomial multiplication.
1: procedure K2W(A,B) . Z = A ·B
2: n← max(deg(A), deg(B)) + 1.
3: if N ≤ s then . s is the size (maximum number of bits) of lookup table input
4: return LUT (A,B).
5: end if
6: n← dn/2e.
7: (A1, A0)← SplitTwo(A).
8: (B1, B0)← SplitTwo(B).
9: D0 ← K2W (A0, B0). . recursive productive calls
10: D1 ← K2W (A1, B1).
11: D0,1 ← K2W (A0 ⊕ A1, B0 ⊕B1).
12: Z ← D0 ⊕ ((D0,1 ⊕D0 ⊕D1) n)⊕ (D1  (n 1)). . reconstruction
13: return Z.
14: end procedure
4.2.5 Lookup table of larger size
In Section 4.2.2, we have introduced our 3-bit look up table. However, larger look up tables
are needed to make the algorithm faster. In order to have a look up table of an input size
larger than 3 bits, we develop a method to generate a look up table which takes the number
of bits of the inputs to the multiplication as an input. We use the base look up table and
the Karatsuba algorithm presented in Section 4.2.4 to generate a larger one. Algorithm
4.4 shows the implementation of generating a larger look up table. After generating the
new table Table, LUT is updated to have the new larger table.
4.2.6 The K3W algorithm
An extension of the K2W algorithm is the K3W algorithm. This is shown in Algorithm
4.5. In order to generate the splitting formula for the K3W algorithm, assume we have
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Algorithm 4.4 Algorithm for generating a look up table.
1: procedure GenerateLookupTable(size) . size is the number of bits to the
inputs of polynomial multiplication
2: side← 2size.
3: for a from 0 to side− 1 do
4: for b from 0 to side− 1 do
5: Table[a, b]← Karatsuba(a, b).
6: end for
7: end for
8: LUT ← Table.
9: end procedure
two polynomials A(X) and B(X) of degree n− 1 in F2[X]. We can split these polynomials
into three parts; assuming Y = Xn/3−1, then A(Y ) = A0 + A1Y + A2Y 2 and B(Y ) =
B0 + B1Y + B2Y
2. Then, we evaluate the polynomials at 0, 1 and ∞. However two other
points are needed in the evaluation step to be able to generate the product. The evaluation
Y modulo Y 2 +Y + 1 as suggested in [45] serves the purpose. The product calls are shown
from Line 9 till Line 14 in Algorithm 4.5. This is followed by the reconstruction step.
4.2.7 The IK3W algorithm
In [7], a re-arrangement of the reconstruction process is proposed to save some computation.
Algorithm 4.6 shows this improvement. The algorithm is similar to the previous one with
the difference in the reconstruction step which starts at Line 15.
4.2.8 The B3W algorithm
Bernstein suggested a recursive algorithm for polynomial multiplication [18]. The idea is to
do the evaluation at 0, 1, X,X + 1 and ∞. Algorithm 4.7 shows the Bernstein polynomial
multiplication algorithm. The multi-evaluation starts at Line 9 and ends at Line 16. The
reconstruction step includes division by R4 =
R3
X2+X
. This can be done by first dividing R3
by X and then dividing the result by X+1. The first one is a right shift shown at Line 26.
The division by X + 1 can be done by noticing that R
′
4[i] = R
′
4[i+ 1] +R4[i+ 2] where i is
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Algorithm 4.5 K3W polynomial multiplication algorithm.
1: procedure K3W(A,B) . Z = A ·B
2: n← max(deg(a), deg(b)).
3: if N ≤ s then . s is the size (maximum number of bits) of lookup table input
4: return LUT (A,B).
5: end if
6: n← dn/3e
7: (A2, A1, A0)← SplitThree(A).
8: (B2, B1, B0)← SplitThree(B).
9: P0 ← K3W (A0, B0). . recursive product calls
10: P1 ← K3W (A1, B1).
11: P2 ← K3W (A2, B2).
12: P3 ← K3W (A0 ⊕ A1, B0 ⊕B1).
13: P4 ← K3W (A1 ⊕ A2, B1 ⊕B2).
14: P5 ← K3W (A0 ⊕ A2, B0 ⊕B2).
15: R0 ← P0 ⊕ P1. . reconstruction
16: R1 ← P3 ⊕R0.
17: R2 ← P1 ⊕ P0 ⊕ P2 ⊕ P5.
18: R3 ← P4 ⊕ P1 ⊕ P2.
19: Z ← P0 ⊕ (R1  n)⊕ (R2  (n 1))⊕ (R3  (3 · n))⊕ (P2  (n 2))
20: return Z.
21: end procedure
47
Algorithm 4.6 The IK3W polynomial multiplication.
1: procedure IK3W(A,B) . Z = A ·B
2: n← max(deg(a), deg(b)).
3: if N ≤ s then . s is the size (maximum number of bits) of lookup table input
4: return LUT (A,B).
5: end if
6: n← dn/3e
7: (A2, A1, A0)← SplitThree(A).
8: (B2, B1, B0)← SplitThree(B).
9: P0 ← IK3W (A0, B0). . recursive product calls
10: P1 ← IK3W (A1, B1).
11: P2 ← IK3W (A2, B2).
12: P3 ← IK3W (A0 ⊕ A1, B0 ⊕B1).
13: P4 ← IK3W (A1 ⊕ A2, B1 ⊕B2).
14: P5 ← IK3W (A0 ⊕ A2, B0 ⊕B2).
15: R0 ← P0 ⊕ (P1  n)⊕ (P2  (n 1)). . reconstruction
16: R1 ← R0 ⊕ (R0  n)⊕ (R0  (n 1)).
17: Z ← R1 ⊕ (P3  n)⊕ (P5  (n 1))⊕ (P4  (3 · n)).
18: return Z.
19: end procedure
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the bit index number. By assuming R4 of degree n, then R4 starts from R4[n− 2] = R3[n].
These are done in the while loop at Line 28. The division makes the B3W algorithm
slower compared to other algorithms.
4.2.9 The FE3W algorithm
Algorithms 4.8 and 4.9 show the FE3W polynomial multiplication algorithm. The idea is
similar to the Bernstein multievaluation, but instead of evaluating at X and X + 1, the
field is extended to F4 and the polynomials are evaluated at 0, 1, α, α + 1 and ∞. Two
of the product calls in Algorithm 4.8 invoke Algorithm 4.9 which is similar to the first
algorithm. However, it takes the input in F4 format so the first two inputs are the first
polynomial and the other two inputs constitute the second polynomial. Each polynomial
is represented by two inputs: one is the non-α part and the other is the α-part.
In Algorithm 4.9, the way to access the look-up table is done by three accesses to the
table. Assume that we have a0 + a1α and b0 + b1α, then their product is a0b0 + a0b1α +
a1b0α+a1b1α
2. But α2 = α+1, hence the result can be rewritten as (a0b0 +a1b1)+(a0b1 +
a1b0 + a1b1)α. However, this needs four accesses to the look-up table. In order to reduce
the number of accesses, we utilize the fact that (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) + a0b0 is equal to the α
part. This reduces the number of look-up table accesses to three. This starts at Line 4
and ends at Line 7 in Algorithm 4.9.
4.3 Reduction Algorithms
In section 2.2.4, we have introduced reduction and discussed fast reduction algorithms. In
this section, we show our implementation of reduction algorithms. Algorithms 4.10 show
the reduction algorithm where the polynomial has maximum size m = 163 module the
NIST recommended field f(z) = z163 + z7 + z6 + z3 + 1. For other NIST recommended
fields refer to algorithms A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 in Appendix A. These algorithms take
advantage of the knowledge of the field and the small number of non-zeros in the field
defining polynomials (trinomial or pentanomial).
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Algorithm 4.7 B3W polynomial multiplication algorithm.
1: procedure B3W(A,B) . Z = A ·B
2: n← max(deg(A), deg(B)).
3: if N ≤ s then . s is the size (maximum number of bits) of lookup table input
4: return LUT (A,B).
5: end if
6: n← dn/3e.
7: (A2, A1, A0)← SplitThree(A).
8: (B2, B1, B0)← SplitThree(B).
9: M1 ← A0 ⊕ A1. . multi-evaluation
10: M
′
1 ← B0 ⊕B1.
11: M2 ← A1 ⊕ A2.
12: M
′
2 ← B1 ⊕B2.
13: M3 ← A0 ⊕M2.
14: M
′
3 ← B0 ⊕M ′2.
15: M4 ←M1 ⊕M2.
16: M
′
4 ←M ′1 ⊕M ′2.
17: P0 ← B3W (A0, B0). . recursive product calls
18: P1 ← B3W (M1,M ′1).
19: P2 ← B3W (M3,M ′3).
20: P3 ← B3W (M4,M ′4).
21: P4 ← B3W (A2, B2).
22: R0 ← P2 ⊕ P3. . reconstruction
23: R1 ← P0 ⊕ ((P0 ⊕ P1) n).
24: R2 ← P2 ⊕ ((R0  n)⊕ (R0  1)).
25: R3 ← R1 ⊕R2 ⊕ ((P4  4)⊕ (P4  1)).
26: R4 ← R3  2. . Start division R4 ← R3X2+X
27: R
′
4 ← R4
28: while R
′
4 6= 0 do
29: R
′
4 ← R′4  1.
30: R4 ← R4 ⊕R′4.
31: end while . End division
32: R5 ← (R4  (n 1))⊕ (R4  n).
33: Z ← R1 ⊕ (P4  (n 2))⊕ (P4  n)⊕R5.
34: return Z.
35: end procedure
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Algorithm 4.8 The FE3W polynomial multiplication algorithm.
1: procedure FE3W(A,B) . Z = A ·B
2: n← max(deg(A), deg(B)).
3: if N ≤ s then . s is the size (maximum number of bits) of lookup table input
4: return LUT (A,B).
5: end if
6: n← dn/3e.
7: (A2, A1, A0)← SplitThree(A).
8: (B2, B1, B0)← SplitThree(B).
9: M1 ← A0 ⊕ A1, M ′1 ← B0 ⊕B1. . multi-evaluation
10: M2 ← A1 ⊕ A2, M ′2 ← B1 ⊕B2.
11: M3α ←M2, M ′3α ←M ′2.
12: M4 ←M1, M4α ←M3α.
13: M
′
4 ←M ′1, M ′4α ←M ′3α.
14: M5 ←M4 ⊕M2, M5α ←M4α.
15: M
′
5 ←M ′4 ⊕M ′2, M ′5α ←M ′4α.
16: M6 ←M1 ⊕ A2, M ′6 ←M ′1 ⊕B2.
17: P0 ← FE3W (A0, B0). . recursive product calls
18: P1 ← FE3W (M6,M ′6).
19: P2 ← FE3WF4(M5,M5α,M ′5,M ′5α).
20: P3 ← FE3WF4(M4,M4α,M ′4,M ′4α).
21: P4 ← FE3W (A2, B2).
22: R0 ← P2[0]⊕ P3[0]. . reconstruction
23: R0α ← P2[1]⊕ P3[1]
24: R1 ← R0α.
25: R2 ← R0 ⊕R0α.
26: R3 ← P1 ⊕R2.
27: R4 ← (R3  n)⊕ (R3  (n 1))⊕ (R3  (3 · n))
28: R5 ← P0 ⊕ (P4  n).
29: R6 ← R5 ⊕ (R5  (3 · n)).
30: Z ← R6 ⊕R4 ⊕ (R1  (3 · n))⊕ (P2[0] (n 1))⊕ (P3[0] n).
31: return Z.
32: end procedure
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Algorithm 4.9 FE3W in F22 polynomial multiplication algorithm.
1: procedure FE3WF4(A,Aα, B,Bα) . Z = A ·B
2: n← max(deg(A), deg(B)).
3: nα ← max(deg(Aα), deg(Bα)).
4: if n ≤ s then . s is the size (maximum number of bits) of lookup table input.
5: C ← LUT (A,B), D ← LUT (Aα, Bα).
6: Z[0]← C ⊕D, Z[1]← LUT (A⊕ Aα, B ⊕Bα)⊕ C.
7: return Z. .
8: end if
9: n← dn/3e.
10: (A2, A1, A0)← SplitThree(A), (A2α, A1α, A0α)← SplitThree(Aα).
11: (B2, B1, B0)← SplitThree(B), (B2α, B1α, B0α)← SplitThree(Bα).
12: M1 ← A0 ⊕ A1, M1α ← A0α ⊕ A1α,M ′1 ← B0 ⊕B1, M ′2α ← B0αB1α.
13: M2 ← A1 ⊕ A2, M2α ← A1α ⊕ A2α, M ′2 ← B1 ⊕B2, M ′2α ← B1α ⊕B2α.
14: M3 ←M2α, M3α ←M2 ⊕M2α, M ′3α ←M ′2, M ′3α ←M ′2.
15: M4 ←M1 ⊕M3, M4α ←M3α⊕.
16: M4 ←M1 ⊕M3, M4α ⊕M1α ⊕M3α,M ′4 ←M ′1 ⊕M ′3, M ′4α ←M ′3α ⊕M ′ .
17: M5 ←M4 ⊕M2, M5α ←M4α ⊕M2α, M ′5 ←M ′4 ⊕M ′2, M ′5α ←M ′4α ⊕M ′2α.
18: M6 ←M1 ⊕ A2, M6α ←M1α ⊕ A2α , M ′6 ←M ′1 ⊕B2, M ′6α ←M ′1α ⊕B2α
19: P0 ← FE3WF4(A0, A0α, B0, B0α). . recursive product calls
20: P1 ← FE3WF4(M6,M6α,M ′6),M ′6α).
21: P2 ← FE3WF4(M5,Mα5 ,M ′5,M ′α5).
22: P3 ← FE3WF4(M4,Mα4 ,M ′4,M ′α4).
23: P4 ← FE3WF4(A2, A2α, B2, B2α).
24: R0 ← P2[0]⊕ P3[0]. . reconstruction
25: Rα0 ← P2[1]⊕ P3[1].
26: R1 ← Rα0 , .
27: R2 ← R0 ⊕Rα0 .
28: R3 ← P1 ⊕R2.
29: R4 ← (R3  n)⊕ (R3  (n 1))⊕ (R3  (3 · n)).
30: R5 ← P0 ⊕ (P4  n).
31: R6 ← R5 ⊕ (R5  (3 · n)).
32: Z ← R6 ⊕R4 ⊕ (R1  (3 · n))⊕ (P2[0] (n 1))⊕ (P3[0] n).
33: return Z.
34: end procedure
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Algorithm 4.10 Reduction modulo f(z) = z163 + z7 + z6 + z3 + 1.
1: procedure Reduce163(x) . x is a polynomial of size maximum 2m− 2 where
m = 163.
2: ones← 2163 − 1.
3: temp← x 163.
4: result← x & ones
5: result← result⊕ (temp 7)⊕ (temp 6)⊕ (temp 3)⊕ temp.
6: temp← result 163.
7: result← result⊕ (temp 7)⊕ (temp 6)⊕ (temp 3)⊕ temp.
8: result← result & ones.
9: return result.
10: end procedure
4.4 Elliptic Curve Algorithms
An elliptic curve point multiplication uses point doubling and point addition algorithms.
As a result, improvements in these algorithms lead to higher speed in point multiplication
algorithm [6]. In section 2.3.5, we have introduced point addition and point doubling
algorithms. However, in [6] an improvement has been proposed. In this section, these
proposed point addition and point doubling algorithms are presented.
4.4.1 Point addition
Algorithm 4.11 shows the CANH point addition algorithm. This method calls a modi-
fication of the method FieldExtensionF4 such that it takes the first input in F2 and the
other in F4. We refer this method in the code as Multiply2,4. This is also useful when
there is simultaneous occurrence of field multiplication like AB and AC. The result of
both multiplications can be achieved by a single call to the Multiply2,4 method. Any other
multiplication is just denoted by ” · ”, which can be any of the polynomial multiplica-
tion methods explained earlier. A call of an appropriate reduction algorithm has to be
understood after any call of polynomial multiplication or square methods.
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Algorithm 4.11 CANH point addition algorithm.
1: procedure CANHPointAdd(P,Q) . P and Q are two points on a curve
2: if P =∞ then
3: return Q.
4: end if
5: if Q =∞ then
6: return P .
7: end if
8: T1 ←Multiply2,4(ZQ, YP , XP ).
9: T2 ← T1[0], T3 ← T1[1].
10: T4 ←Multiply2,4(ZP , YQ, XQ).
11: T5 ← T4[0], T6 ← T4[1].
12: T7 ← T2 ⊕ T5.
13: T8 ← T3 ⊕ T6.
14: T9 ← T7 ⊕ T8.
15: T10 ← T82. . Calling Square method
16: T11 ← ZP · ZQ.
17: T12 ← T8 · T10.
18: T13 ←Multiply2,4(T7, T9, T3).
19: T14 ← T13[0].
20: T15 ← T13[1].
21: T16 ← T14 ⊕ (a2, T10). . a2 is the value in the Weierstrass equation.
22: T17 ←Multiply2,4(T20, T8, T9).
23: T18 ← T17[0].
24: T19 ← T17[1].
25: ZR ← T19.
26: T20 ← T18 ⊕ T12.
27: T21 ←Multiply2,4(T20, T8, T9).
28: T22 ← T21[0].
29: T23 ← T21[1].
30: XR ← T22.
31: YR ← (T10 · (T15 ⊕ (T8 · T2)))⊕ T23.
32: return R.
33: end procedure
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4.4.2 Point doubling
Algorithm 4.12 shows the CANH point doubling algorithm. Similar techniques to point
addition algorithm are used in this point doubling algorithm to achieve a higher speed.
Algorithm 4.12 CANH point doubling algorithm.
1: procedure CANHPointDouble(P ) . P is a point on a curve
2: if P =∞ then
3: return P .
4: end if
5: T1 ← Xp2. . Calling Square method
6: T2 ←Multiply2,4(Zp).
7: T3 ← T2[0].
8: T4 ← T2[1].
9: T5 ← T1 ⊕ T3.
10: T6 ← T4 ⊕ T5.
11: T7 ← T42.
12: T8 ← (T5 · T6)⊕ (a2 · T7).
13: T9 ←Multiply2,4(T8, T4, T6).
14: T10 ← T9[0].
15: T11 ← T9[1].
16: T12 ← T12.
17: T13 ←Multiply2,4(T4, T12, T7).
18: T14 ← T13[0].
19: T15 ← T13[1].
20: XR ← T10.
21: YR ← T11 ⊕ T14.
22: ZR ← T15.
23: return R.
24: end procedure
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4.5 Summary
Implementation oriented view of algorithms of our interest have been given in this chap-
ter. This view helps us look at the points that need further improvement for subsequent
implementation versions. Each algorithm has been implemented in a class and each set of
related algorithms has their interface. Examples include polynomial multiplication algo-
rithms and reduction algorithms. The K2W, K3W, IK3W, B3W and FE3W algorithms
have been considered under the set of polynomial multiplication algorithms. We have
shown the implementation details of using the field extension method Multiply2,4. The
following chapter has the results of our implementation.
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Chapter 5
Timing Results
In this chapter, we discuss the timing results of multiplication of polynomial of different
sizes. Then, we discuss the timing results of point multiplication algorithms.
5.1 Machine Information
Our software ran on Intel Core i7 with 2.8 GHz and 8.00 GB memory (RAM). The operating
system is Windows 7 Professional. As mentioned earlier, the programming language used
is C# with .Net framework 4.0, and the development environment is Visual Studio 2010.
5.2 Polynomial Multiplication Timing
In this section, timing results for polynomial multiplication are presented.
5.2.1 Experiment setup
The goal is to determine how long it will take for a specific polynomial multiplication
algorithm to multiply two polynomials of different sizes. The length n, which is d+1 where
d is the degree, ranges from 8 bits to 1200 bits at an increment of 8. Each multiplication
is run 150 times and their timings are averaged. The experiment is run for the K2W,
57
K3W, IK3W, B3W, and FE3W algorithms. Also these algorithms are run with different
padding methods: power and multiple. In the power padding, the length of the input is
incremented such that it is a power of 2 in the case of K2W, and a power of 3 in the case
of other polynomial multiplication methods. In the multiple padding, a number of zeros
is padded to the input such that its new length is multiple of 3; this needs to be done in
every iteration to be able to divide the polynomial into three equal sub-polynomials.
5.2.2 Timing results
Figure 5.1 shows the number of clock cycles it takes for each multiplication algorithm with
different sizes of polynomials in the case of multiple padding.
Figure 5.1: The number of clock cycles required for each polynomial multiplication algo-
rithm at different input sizes in the case of multiple padding.
From Figure 5.1, we notice that there are points where there is a noticeable increase
in the time or jump needed to complete the multiplication compared to previous sizes.
In the case of the K2W algorithm, the sizes are close to 128, 256, 512, and 1024, which
are all actually a power of two. The reason is that, at these points, an additional round
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of recursive multiplication call is needed. Similarly, other algorithms have jumps at sizes
81, 243, and 729, because they are power of 3 and are used in 3-way split algorithms. The
K2W algorithm seems to perform best except in the range from 512 to 729 where the IK3W
is the best. The B3W algorithm takes longer than other algorithms almost in all cases in
our experiments. The jumps are not very clear in the case of the B3W algorithm because
two of the recursive calls are longer than the length divided by 3. The B3W algorithm
takes longer in general because of the division it requires. We note that the jumps can
be turned into gradual increases by carefully optimizing computations involved in each
recursion. In this work, we have not tried such optimizations for ease of implementation.
Figure 5.2 shows the number of clock cycles needed for multiplication of two polynomials
of different sizes where the power padding method is used.
Figure 5.2: The number of clock cycles spent for each polynomial multiplication algorithm
at different input sizes in the case of power padding.
It is clear from Figure 5.2 that the jumps are sharper in the case of power padding than
in the multiple padding because of the way power and multiple are different. Locations of
the jumps are similar to the case of multiple at powers of 2 and 3.
Since the code give us the correct result and it strongly match the algorithm, this gives
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us strong indication of the correctness of the timing results. The staircase look of the figure
is due to the nature of split location and the recursive implementation used in polynomial
multiplication. The figure also covers a very large range of the field size, a huge jump at
the end.
In the K2W algorithm, it is observed that power padding jumps occur before multiple
padding jumps. In most of the sizes, the number of clock cycles (ticks) is close in both
cases. In IK3W algorithm, until about 700 bits, multiple and power are almost the same.
Power achieves better results after about 715 bits. In the B3W algorithm, Multiple padding
performs much better than the power padding. Two recursive calls of the B3W algorithm
have some extra bits in addition to the previous size divided by three making the jump
higher in the case of power. The jumps in multiple are not very clear, but one can notice
a slow increase.
5.3 Polynomial Multiplication for NIST Field Sizes
The point multiplication algorithm in elliptic curve cryptography must be in a field. Here
we consider the five binary fields corresponding to NIST recommended curves B163, B233,
B283, B409, and B571 [9]. In this section, we show the result of polynomial multiplication
for these fields. The proposed point multiplication uses the Multiply2,4 method, that is a
modification of the 3-way field extension method that takes one input in F2 and the other
in F4. Therefore, this polynomial multiplication method is also implemented and tested.
5.3.1 Experiment setup
The input size is chosen to be equal to the field and the number of times each multiplication
is performed is 150 so that we can determine its average. The polynomial multiplication
algorithms tested are the K2W, the K3W, the IK3W, the FE3W, the Multiply2,4, which
is a modification of FE3W, and the B3W algorithms.
5.3.2 Timing results
Figure 5.3 shows the number of clock cycles for polynomial multiplication algorithms in
the case of multiple padding. It can be observed that the larger the field, the more number
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of clock cycles needed. Moreover, the K2W algorithm performs the best, followed by the
IK3W, then the K3W algorithm, after that the FE3W algorithm, and then the Multiply2,4,
and finally the B3W algorithm. In the fields F2163 and F2233 , the IK3W algorithm performs
better than the K2W.
Figure 5.3: Polynomial multiplication clock cycles at NIST fields.
5.4 Point Multiplication Results
In this section, the timing results of point multiplication are shown. The focus is to see how
the CANH algorithms improves over the conventional algorithms in point multiplication.
The CANH algorithms is the one that makes use of Multiply2,4 or FE3W-F2F4 algorithm.
5.4.1 Experiment setup
Three types of polynomial multiplication algorithms are used. These are the K2W [14],
the IK3W [7], and the B3W [18]. Also we use several point multiplication algorithms: the
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Table 5.1: The legend table to be used in the tables of results of point multiplication
algorithm.
Legend Meaning
Polynomial Multiplication A K2W Algorithm [14]
B IK3W Algorithm [7]
C B3W Algorithm [18]
Point Multiplication I double-and-add algorithm (Page 96 of [8])
II Binary NAF algorithm (Page 99 of [8])
III Window NAF algorithm (Page 100 of [8])
Point addition/ doubling Conventional Reported in [12]
CANH The work by Cenk M. et al. [6]
Padding Method M Multiple padding
P Power padding
general double-and-add algorithm (Page 96 of [8]), the binary NAF algorithm (Page 99
of [8]), and the window NAF algorithm (Page 100 of [8]). Both the conventional [12] and
the CANH [6] point addition and point doubling algorithms that are invoked by the point
multiplication algorithm are used. We also use two types of padding methods: power and
multiple. Table 5.1 shows the legends of these algorithms used in the result tables that
follow. Each point multiplication algorithm is run 100 times for every possible case and
then their average is computed.
5.4.2 Timing results
In Table 5.2, the timing results of point multiplication is shown for B163. In each case,
there is an improvement when using the CANH algorithm: The greatest improvement
is when using the B3W algorithm, the least improvement result from using the IK3W
algorithm. When using the power padding in case of the B3W algorithm, we can see that
the improvement of the CANH method is quite significant, because of the longer time the
B3W algorithm needs to perform polynomial multiplication in the case of power padding.
Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 show the results of point multiplication algorithms in
the cases of the fields B233, B283, B409, and B571 accordingly. The use of the CANH
algorithm improves the overall performance in most cases. When using the K2W algorithm
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and the field is not B233, there is a reduction of the speed because of the efficiency of the
K2W algorithm in these cases. The greatest improvement is generally found when using
the B3W algorithm.
In these tables, the bold font is used when we have the fastest configuration combina-
tions. In the case of B163, the minimum number of ticks is 3645008, which occurs when
using the CANH point addition/doubling algorithms, the IK3W polynomial multiplication
method, Window NAF point multiplication and multiple padding. Similar configuration
for the minimum number of ticks required in the case of B233 but the power padding
method is used. In the other cases, i.e. B283, B409, and B571, the best configuration is
to use the K2W polynomial multiplication algorithm, Window NAF point multiplication,
and conventional point addition/doubling algorithms.
5.5 Summary
We have a number of experiments in order to get our timing results. We have seen how
different polynomial algorithms work under different sizes and different configurations.
The K2W, K3W, IK3W, B3W, and FE3W algorithms have been considered. We have run
several experiments for point multiplication to see the effect of using the CANH algorithm
and see what configuration gives the best results. We have found that the use of the
CANH point addition/doubling with the IK3W algorithms work the best in the cases of
B163 and B233. However, in other cases, the K2W algorithm with the conventional point
addition/doubling algorithms gives the minimum number of clock cycles. We have also
found that the use of the CANH algorithms gives us better results than the conventional
algorithms, except for the K2W algorithm for B283, B409 and B571.
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Table 5.2: Point multiplication clock cycles in the case of B163.
Poly. Mult. Point Mult Padding
Clock cycles
Improvement %Conventional CANH
A
I
M 5421410 4827576 10.95
P 5381407 4785173 11.08
II
M 4569161 4030330 11.79
P 4679167 4212340 9.98
III
M 4049031 3941025 2.67
P 4212840 4093934 2.82
B
I
M 4966284 4695868 5.45
P 5115592 4773573 6.69
II
M 4238042 3939225 7.05
P 4449254 4082233 8.25
III
M 3740613 3645008 2.56
P 3968727 3903223 1.65
C
I
M 9544345 5754029 39.71
P 27213956 10193883 62.54
II
M 8079862 4829476 40.23
P 22838306 8761101 61.64
III
M 7224513 6512172 9.86
P 20269759 16894066 16.65
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Table 5.3: Point multiplication clock cycles in the case of B233.
Poly. Mult. Point Mult Padding
Clock cycles
Improvement %Conventional CANH
A
I
M 8067661 7285916 9.69
P 8154766 7331719 10.09
II
M 6845391 6148751 10.18
P 6947997 6363763 8.41
III
M 6004543 5853834 2.51
P 6172353 5934839 3.85
B
I
M 7694440 7160609 6.94
P 7551031 7019201 7.04
II
M 6556475 6070547 7.41
P 6422567 6016144 6.33
III
M 5749328 5640322 1.9
P 5744828 5633122 1.94
C
I
M 37935669 14594034 61.53
P 42462028 16006315 62.3
II
M 32267545 13665581 57.65
P 35800247 13105349 63.39
III
M 30864865 24677311 20.05
P 31870722 26231500 17.69
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Table 5.4: Point multiplication clock cycles in the case of B283.
Poly. Mult. Point Mult Padding
Clock cycles
Improvement %Conventional CANH
A
I
M 10881222 30535046 -180.62
P 25665667 33903939 -32.1
II
M 9355335 26849535 -187
P 21625936 29359079 -35.76
III
M 8373878 12218498 -45.91
P 18937283 20858993 -10.15
B
I
M 49123109 41300262 15.92
P 43775203 39204142 10.44
II
M 41800490 35018402 16.22
P 37235629 32846278 11.79
III
M 36094264 34593378 4.16
P 32238743 31256387 3.05
C
I
M 67240145 45650311 32.11
P 237361776 90522477 61.86
II
M 57641296 38369894 33.43
P 206409505 76017947 63.17
III
M 50600694 46111737 8.87
P 180311613 148273180 17.77
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Table 5.5: Point multiplication clock cycles in the case of B409.
Poly. Mult. Point Mult Padding
Clock cycles
Improvement %Conventional CANH
A
I
M 42828349 53475558 -24.86
P 40238401 50129267 -24.58
II
M 36159768 45116980 -24.77
P 34329963 42545533 -23.93
III
M 31501001 33538918 -6.47
P 29895409 32053533 -7.22
B
I
M 73310193 61310006 16.37
P 70965659 60355652 14.95
II
M 62334065 51856466 16.81
P 59840922 49699942 16.95
III
M 53819278 50199171 6.73
P 52191385 50034261 4.13
C
I
M 113696803 68033891 40.16
P 352578366 130656273 62.94
II
M 96625126 57558692 40.43
P 297647624 107657457 63.83
III
M 86156327 77154112 10.45
P 262148494 221850089 15.37
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Table 5.6: Point multiplication clock cycles in the case of B571.
Poly. Mult. Point Mult Padding
Clock cycles
Improvement %Conventional CANH
A
I
M 62667584 76953201 -22.8
P 158105943 107627655 31.93
II
M 52940027 65044520 -22.86
P 134841912 90844195 32.63
III
M 45986630 48924698 -6.39
P 123196646 108932830 11.58
B
I
M 107382341 89085095 17.04
P 109359555 91792750 16.06
II
M 90293664 74386454 17.62
P 92784406 79228031 14.61
III
M 78284477 75024891 4.16
P 83380069 79483946 4.67
C
I
M 347784092 148922117 57.18
P 559202784 203432235 63.62
II
M 294669654 122611913 58.39
P 477184193 175774853 63.16
III
M 258508485 221163849 14.45
P 416272509 337970130 18.81
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Chapter 6
CANH Method on Pairing and
Hyperelliptic Curves
In this chapter, we use the CANH trick in order to improve the performance of the pairing
computation algorithm and the major operations of hyperelliptic, i.e. divisor addition
and doubling algorithms. Hence, this chapter has essentially two parts: the first part
concentrates on pairing and the second one focuses on hyperelliptic curves.
In the pairing part covered in Section 6.2, we propose a new methodology to speed
up the Eta pairing computation. To improve elliptic curve point addition and doubling
algorithms, [6] makes use of the presence of a common factor between multiplications. We
notice the existence of multiplications having common factor, inside the Miller loop of the
Eta pairing algorithm as in [46]. In this work, we present explicit formulæ for the Miller
loop computation that take advantage of the common factors. We also analyze the cost of
the proposed formulæ and compare it with that of the traditional formulae.
In the hyperelliptic curve part covered in Section 6.3, since CANH trick [6] utilizes the
presence of common factors in polynomial multiplications to reduce the time needed for
doing polynomial multiplications, we apply this trick over the explicit formulæ of the group
operations of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2. To our knowledge, the work of Wollinger
and Kovtun [47] presents the fastest explicit formulæ over even characteristic genus 2
hyperelliptic curves. We utilize the presence of common factors in the formulæ to apply
the CANH trick to it. The outcome of the research shows an improvement when field size
is higher than a certain threshold. The improvement increases for higher field sizes.
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Before going to the details, the notations used and their corresponding complexity is
given in Section 6.1. At the end of this chapter, a summary of our findings is presented in
Section 6.4.
6.1 Notations
In Section 3.1.4 we discussed the 3-way split algorithm proposed in [7]. This polynomial
multiplication is denoted as M2, where the number of additions is 5.27n
log3(6)−6.67n+1.4
and the number of multiplications is nlog3(6); therefore, the total arithmetic complexity is
6.27nlog3(6)−6.67n+1.4. A 3-way split polynomial multiplications with five multiplications
based on field extension is described [7] and presented in Section 3.1.6. The number of
additions of this method is 27.75nlog3(5) − 9.67n log3(n) − 28.5n + 0.75 and the number
of multiplications is 3nlog3(5) − 2n . The total arithmetic complexity is: 30.75nlog3(5) −
9.67n log3(n) − 30.5n + 0.75. In Section 3.1.7 we discussed the reduction of two F2[X]
multiplication to one F4[X] multiplication [6]. For this a field extension based multiplication
algorithm is used where one input in F2[X] and the other is in F4[X]; it is denoted as M2,4.
In this case, the number of additions is 26.75nlog3(5) − 2.33n log3(n) − 32n + 10.5 and the
number of multiplications is 4nlog3(5) − 2n, therefore the total arithmetic complexity is:
30.75nlog3(5) − 2.33n log3(n)− 34n+ 10.5.
Table 6.1 summarizes the notations used in this chapter to denote a certain operation
cost and the total arithmetic complexity that certain operation costs. The first one is
the cost of adding two polynomials of degree n − 1; it is denoted by Add, and therefore
the arithmetic cost is n. The second one is the cost of squaring, since (
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i)
2
=∑n−1
i=0 aix
2i so it is computation free. Since we need to perform reduction after that we
choose to include the cost of reduction cost of squaring. In [48] it is proven that the
reduction (R2) be done in (r − 1)(n− 1) bit additions where r is the Hamming weight of
the irreducible polynomial. Since in practice there is always a pentanomial of degree n, the
reduction can be done at 4(n− 1) bit additions. Reduction in F4, denoted as R4, requires
double the cost i.e. 8(n−1) bit operations. The last one is the cost of square root denoted
by sqrt and is used only in pairing; this cost choice is explained in Section 6.2.3.
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Table 6.1: Summary of operations and their complexity costs.
Operation description Symbol Cost
Addition in F2[X] Add n
Squaring in F2[X] S 4n− 4
Reduction in F2[X] R2 4n−4 (pentanomial), 2n−2 (trinomial)
Reduction in F4[X] R4 8n−8 (pentanomial), 4n−4 (trinomial)
Multiplication in F2[X] based on
three way split [7]
M2 6.27nlog3(6) − 6.67n+ 1.4
Multiplication one input in F2[X]
and the other in F4[X] [6]
M2,4 30.75nlog3(5)−2.33n log3(n)−34n+10.5
Square root in F2[X] sqrt (n− 1)/2
6.2 Applying CANH on Pairing
Bilinear pairing has numorous applications; examples include one round three-party key
agreement protocol, identity based encryption, and aggregate signatures. For an excellent
introduction to pairing based cryptography the reader can refer to [4]. Many types of
pairing exist but the basic types, upon which other types depend, are Weil and Tate
pairings. Eta pairing, a variation of Tate pairing, can be written in terms of Tate pairing.
For a well-written dictionary of different types of pairing from mathematical point of view,
the reader should refer to [49].
In [46], a high speed hardware implementation of Eta pairing is proposed. Toepliz
matrix vector product methodology is also given in [46] to increase the speed further. In
[6] an idea to utilize field extension polynomial multiplication to speed up elliptic curve
algorithms is investigated. They combine multiplications that have a common factor into
a multiplication of a higher field to speed up the point doubling and point addition algo-
rithms. As a result, they could have faster point multiplication, which is the core operation
of any cryptographic protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography. We observe a common
factor pattern within the most expensive operation in Miller’s loop, which is the main loop
in a pairing algorithm, such as Eta pairing. We develop explicit formulæ for the previous
and proposed Miller’s loop. We analyze the results and compute the theoretical cost.
In Section 6.2.1 the Eta pairing algorithm is described with emphasis on Miller’s loop
71
and on one special multiplication inside it. In Section 6.2.2, our methodology of improving
Miller’s loop and consequently Eta pairing is presented. Then, Section 6.2.3 compares the
of arithmetic cost of both the previous and the proposed algorithms.
6.2.1 Eta pairing algorithm
Consider a supersingular curve E defined by Y 2 + Y = X3 + X over the field F21223 . The
number of points on the curve, i.e., #E(F21223) = 5r where r = (21223 + 2512 + 1)/5 [50].
The embedding degree of the curve E is k = 4; therefore, the extension field F24·1223 is used.
This field is constructed using two degree-2 extensions: F22·1223 = F21223 [α]/(α2 + α + 1)
and F24·1223 = F22·1223 [β]/(β2 + β + α).
Consider a point P ∈ E(F21223) of order r and consider the subgroup µr of F∗24·1223 which
has an order of r. The Eta (ηT ) pairing is defined
ηT : 〈P 〉 × 〈P 〉 → µr
as ηT (P1, P2) = e(P1, ψ(P2)), such that e is the Tate pairing and ψ(x, y) = (x + α
2, y +
xα+β). Barreto et al. proposed Algorithm 6.1 for the computation of the ηT pairing [50].
Algorithm 6.1 ηT pairing [50]
Input: P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) ∈ E(F21223)[r].
Output: ηT (P1, P2).
T ← x1 + 1
f ← T · (x1 + x2 + 1) + y1 + y2 + (T + x2)α + β
for i = 1 to 612 do
T ← x1, x1 ← √x1, y1 ← √y1
g ← T · (x1 + x2) + y1 + y2 + x1 + 1 + (T + x2)α + β
f ← f · g
x2 ← x22, y2 ← y22
end forreturn (f 2
(2·1223−1)(21223−2612+1))
The computations that will take almost all the time are inside the for loop which is
a re-expression of the Miller loop of the Tate pairing. We refer to it in this work as the
Miller loop for simplicity. In the next section more analysis of this loop is provided.
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Miller’s loop
Inside the for loop, there are two square root computations in the first step. There is
one multiplication in F21223 (T · (x1 + x2 + 1)) in the second step and it also includes five
additions in order to compute g. The third step is a special multiplication f · g in F24·1223
to update f . Finally, there are two squaring computations in the last step. The f.g special
multiplication is expressed in terms of additions and multiplications in F21223 . The next
section elaborates further.
The f.g multiplication
Due to the special form of g = g0 + g1α + β, the F24·1223 multiplication is reduced to two
F22·1223 multiplications plus a number of additions [46]. We write f = f0+f1α+f2β+f3αβ,
then f · g is expressed:
fg = (f0 + f1α)(g0 + g1α) + (f2 + f3α)(g0 + g1α)β + (f0 + f1α + f2β + f3αβ)β
= ((f0 + f1α)(g0 + g1α) + f3 + (f2 + f3)α) + ((f2 + f3α)(g0 + g1α) + f0 + f2
+(f1 + f3)α)β
Basically, there are two multiplications in F22·1223 : (f0+f1α)(g0+g1α) and (f2+f3α)(g0+
g1α) in addition to adding the results to f3 + (f1 + f3)α and f0 + f2 + (f1 + f3)α. We need
to look at the cost of multiplication in F22·1223 .
Using the Karatsuba formula, one multiplication is reduced in F22·1223 to three multipli-
cations and four additions in F21223 by considering the elements of F22·1223 = F21223 [α]/(α2 +
α + 1) of degree one polynomials. If we have two elements in F22·1223 : U = U0 + U1α and
V = V0 +V1α, then we write the three products as P0 = U0V0, P1 = (U0 +U1)(V0 +V1) and
P2 = U1V1. To get the final result C = U×V , we combine these products in reconstruction
step as shown:
C = P0 + (P1 + P0 + P2)α + P2α
2
= P0 + P2 + (P1 + P0)α mod (α
2 + α + 1)
Therefore, f · g requires 6 multiplications and 15 additions in F21223 .
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6.2.2 Improving Miller’s loop
In order to derive explicit formulæ of the two F22·1223 needed to compute the f · g over
F24·1223 inside the Miller loop, the Karatsuba scheme is applied [46]:
(f0 + f1α)(g0 + g1α) = f0g0 + ((f0 + f1)(g0 + g1) + f0g0 + f1g1)α + f1g1α
2
(f2 + f3α)(g0 + g1α) = f2g0 + ((f2 + f3)(g0 + g1) + f2g0 + f3g1)α + f3g1α
2
The six needed multiplications are
t1 = f0g0, t2 = f2g0,
t3 = (f0 + f1)(g0 + g1), t4 = (f2 + f3)(g0 + g1),
t5 = f1g1, t6 = f3g1.
The following formulæ summarize the Miller loop explicit formulæ after reducing the
F24·1223 multiplication:
T = x1, x1 =
√
x1, y1 =
√
y1,
g0 = T · (x1 + x2) + y1 + y2 + x1 + 1, g1 = T + x2,
t1 = f0g0, t2 = f2g0, g01 = g0 + g1,
t3 = (f0 + f1)g01, t4 = (f2 + f3)g01,
t5 = f1g1, t6 = f3g1,
w0 = t1 + t5 + f3, w1 = t3 + t1 + f2 + f3,
w2 = t2 + t6 + f0 + f2, w3 = t4 + t2 + f1 + f3,
f0 = w0, f1 = w1, f2 = w2, f3 = w3,
x2 = x
2
2, y2 = y
2
2.
Note that since f can be expressed as f0 + f1α + f2β + f3αβ, only fi where 0 ≤ i ≤ 3
are present in the explicit formulæ. Since g = g0 + g1α + β, then g2 = 1 and g3 = 0, and
they do not need to be explicitly present in the formulæ. We can easily see that the Miller
loop inside the ηT pairing requires 2 sqrt +7M2 + 7R2 + 2S + 20 Add.
In the six multiplications to compute ti values where 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, g0 is common for t1
and t2 multiplications, (g0 + g1) is common for t3 and t4, and t5 and t6 have the term g1 in
common. We use a single multiplication in F4 to replace two multiplications in F2 [6]. The
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field extension based three way split multiplication is described in [7]. As noted earlier, we
have F4 = F2[δ]/(δ2 + δ + 1). We express these multiplications in the following way:
M1 = g0(f0 + f2δ), M2 = M1,0, M3 = M1,1
M4 = (g0 + g1)(f0 + f1 + (f2 + f3)δ), M5 = M4,0, M6 = M4,1
M7 = g1(f1 + f3δ), M8 = M7,0, M9 = M7,1
Note that the multiplication results Mi where i ∈ {1, 4, 7} are in F4[X] while the other
values of the multiplications are in F2[X]. These values are set to Mi,t where t ∈ {0, 1},
the 0 in t corresponds to the non-δ part, the 1 in t indexes the δ part. We then write the
explicit formulæ after the modification of the Miller loop in ηT pairing as follows:
T = x1, x1 =
√
x1, y1 =
√
y1,
g0 = T · (x1 + x2) + y1 + y2 + x1 + 1, g1 = T + x2,
M1 = g0(f0 + f2δ),
M2 = M1,0, M3 = M1,1
M4 = (g0 + g1)(f0 + f1 + (f2 + f3)δ),
M5 = M4,0, M6 = M4,1
M7 = g1(f1 + f3δ),
M8 = M7,0, M9 = M7,1
w0 = M2 +M8 + f3, w1 = M5 +M2 + f2 + f3,
w2 = M3 +M9 + f0 + f2, w3 = M6 +M3 + f1 + f3,
f0 = w0, f1 = w1, f2 = w2, f3 = w3,
x2 = x
2
2, y2 = y
2
2.
As in the above formulæ, the six multiplications in F2[X] are replaced by three multi-
plications in F4[X]. We can notice that the total cost of Miller’s loop after the modification
is 2 sqrt +1M2 + 1R2 + 3M2,4 + 3R4 + 2S + 20 Add.
6.2.3 Cost comparison
We consider the cost of the square root to be equal to (n − 1)/2. In [46], a methodology
is suggested to perform square root in F21223 , so if we have an element A =
∑1223
i=0 aix
i in
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F21223 , then we can write
√
A =
√√√√ 611∑
i=0
a2ix2i +
√√√√ 610∑
i=0
a2i+1x2i+1 =
(
611∑
i=0
a2ix
i
)
+
√
x
(
610∑
i=0
a2i+1x
i
)
.
However, x = x256+x1224 mod (1+x255+x1223), so
√
x = x128+x612 mod (1+x255+x1223).
Hence,
√
A =
∑127
i=0 a2ix
i +
∑611
i=128(a2i + a2i−256+1)x
i +
∑126
i=0(a2i+1 + a2(i+612−128)+1)x
i+612 +∑610
i=127 a2i+1x
i+612. The number of XOR gates needed (or additions) is 611 which is n−1
2
knowing that n = 1223.
The total arithmetic cost of a single round of Miller’s loop using the previous technique
is 43.89nlog3(6) − 3.69n − 41.2. After utilizing the field extension multiplication, the total
arithmetic cost is 6.27nlog3(6) + 92.25nlog3(5) − 6.99n log(n) − 65.67n − 18.1. Table 6.2
summarizes the cost of Miller’s loop in terms of both basic operations and arithmetic cost.
Table 6.2: The cost of one round of the Miller loop in ηT pairing using the previous and
the proposed techniques
Miller loop method No. of basic operations Arithmetic cost
previous 2 sqrt +7M2 + 7R2 + 2S +
20 Add
43.89nlog3(6) − 3.69n− 41.2
proposed 2 sqrt +1M2 + 1R2 +
3M2,4 + 3R4 + 2S + 20 Add
6.27nlog3(6) + 92.25nlog3(5) −
6.99n log3(n)−65.67n−18.1
By substituting n = 1223 as in the algorithm, the total arithmetic cost for the previous
formulæ is 4756918 and that of the proposed formulæ is 3620404. Therefore, we observe
an improvement of 23.9% by applying the common factor technique. Almost all the cost
of the ηT pairing algorithm is a direct result of Miller’s loop. Improving Miller’s loop in
Algorithm 6.1 will likely to significantly increase the speed of this algorithm because it has
611 iterations.
6.2.4 Software implementation and results
In order to verify the theoretical results, we implemented the pairing algorithm in soft-
ware. We used C] as programing language with visual studio as development framework.
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The personal laptop used is Intel(R) core(TM) i7-3632QM and has speed of 2.2 GH. The
operating system is Windows 8 home edition. Algorithm 6.1 has been implemented which
contains both the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. Refer to [46] for details of
the algorithms involved under the final exponentiation. The CANH based version of the
pairing has also been implemented.
The experiment ran 50 times for each of the different pairing algorithms enabling us to
compute the average. The typical pairing algorithm takes 344835765 clock cycles. After
applying the CANH trick, the algorithm takes 250789374 clock cycles. Therefore, applying
CANH trick into pairing results in an improvement of 27.27%.
6.3 Applying CANH on Hyperelliptic Curves
The CANH trick works over binary fields and uses a 3-way split polynomial multiplication
algorithm [6]. Similar to elliptic curves, hyperelliptic curves have group operations, which
are addition and doubling. However, here the operations are applied to the divisor over
the Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves. In [47], the fastest explicit formulæ for hyperelliptic
curves over even characteristic genus 2 hyperelliptic curves using projective coordinates are
presented. In this paper, we apply the CANH trick over the explicit formulæ given in [47].
Cantor, in his breakthrough paper in 1987, introduced an algorithm to make computa-
tions in the Jacobian of hyperelliptic curve for doing group laws operations such as addition
[51]. His work focuses on odd characteristics, but Koblitz in his paper in 1988 extended his
work to even characteristics and introduced a complete hyperelliptic cryptosystem [52]. A
number of references provide excellent background about hyperelliptic curves; for example
see [5] and [53].
Harley [54] has significantly optimized Cantor’s algorithm. In [55], there are efficient
explicit formulæ for group operations for hyperelliptic curves over genus 2. In [56], Lange
introduces new explicit formulæ that are inversion free by using projective coordinates.
Lange’s work in [57] improves Harley’s work and also provides explicit formulæ for compu-
tations over genus 2. The work of Wollingor and Kovtun [47] improves the explicit formulæ
of hyperelliptic curves of both even and odd characteristics.
The work of Costello and Lauter [58] has better explicit formulæ than [47] but only in
odd characteristics. The work of Avanzi et al. improves the explicit formulæ in genus 3
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and genus 4. The work of Gaudry [59] proposes a very fast algorithm for genus 2 arithmetic
but in the Kummer surface using theta functions.
In this section we will show the use the CANH trick [6] in hyperelliptic curves. It is
based on using field extension 3-way split polynomial multiplication algorithm to replace
two multiplications in F2 by one in F4. The complexity of the field extension multiplication
is less than two multiplications. The field extension multiplication is explained in [7]. This
work considers only binary fields so it is now applied to even characteristic hyperelliptic
curves. The work of Wollinger and Kovtun [47] provides the fastest explicit formulæ on
even characteristic over genus two hyperelliptic curves; therefore, we apply the CANH trick
on their formulæ.
Section 6.3.1 shows the previous and proposed addition formulæ of divisors. The for-
mulæ of doubling before and after applying CANH trick are shown in Section 6.3.2. In
Section 6.3.3, complexity comparison and the improvement of using this trick are high-
lighted.
6.3.1 Addition
The following are the explicit formulæ given in [47] for addition over mixed coordinates for
even characteristics. In the mixed coordinates system, one input is in projective coordinates
and the other is in affine coordinates; that is, it has the Z value equal to one. Using mixed
coordinate saves more operations than projective coordinates. In affine coordinates, an
inversion is needed which is usually a costly operation. We observe that this set of addition
formulæ has a cost of 37 M2, 37 R2, 5 S, and 27 Add.
U˜11 = Z2 · U11, y1 = U˜11 + U21, y2 = U20 + U10 · Z2, y3 = y1 · U11 + y2,
r = y2 · y3 + y21 · U10, inv1 = y1, inv0 = y3, w0 = V10 · Z2 + V20,
w1 = V11 · Z2 + V21, w2 = inv0 ·w0, w3 = inv1 ·w1, s0 = w2 + U10 · w3,
s1 = (inv0 + inv1) · (w0 + w1) + w2 + w3 · U11, R = r · Z2, s2 = s0 · Z2,
s3 = s1 · Z2, R˜ = R · s3, w0 = s1 · s0, w1 = s1 · s3 w2 = s0 · s3, w3 = w1 · U21,
w4 = R · s1, l0 = w0 · U20, l2 = w3 + w2, l1 = (w1 + w0) · (U21 + U20) + l0 + w3,
U˜ ′0 = s
2
2 + s
2
1 · y1U11 + y2 · w1 + R˜ +R · r · y1, U˜ ′1 = w1 · y1 +R2, U ′0 = U˜ ′0 · R˜,
U ′1 = U˜
′
1 · R˜, Z ′ = s23 · R˜, V ′1 = U˜ ′1 · (l2 + U˜ ′1) + s23 · (U˜ ′0 + w4 · V21 + l1),
V ′0 = U˜
′
0 · (l2 + U˜ ′1) + s23 · (l0 + w4 · V20).
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Table 6.3: Summary of common factors in divisor addition.
Multiplications
Common
Multiplications
Common
Factor Factor
Z2 · U11, V10 · Z2 Z2 U10 · Z2, V11 · Z2 Z2
y1 · U11, inv1 ·w1 y1 a y2 · y3, inv0 ·w0 y3 b
y21 · U10, U10 · w3, U10 r · Z2, r · y1 r
s0 · Z2, s1 · Z2 Z2 s1 · s0, s0 · s3 s0
R · s3, R · ry1 R w1 · U21, y2 · w1 w1
R · r · y1, w1y1 y1 U˜ ′0 · R˜, U˜ ′1 · R˜ R˜
U˜ ′1 · (l2 + U˜ ′1), U˜ ′0 · (l2 + U˜ ′1) l2 + U˜ ′1 w4 · V21, w4 · V20 w4
s23 · (U˜ ′0 + w4 · V21 +
l1), s
2
3 · (l0 + w4 · V20)
s23
asince inv1 = y1
bsince inv0 = y3
We find 15 pairs of multiplications which have common factors between them. Table
6.3 summarizes the common factors in the addition formulæ. Note that we utilize inv1 and
inv0 as common factors with y1 and y3 respectively, because they hold the same values and
they are not changed before the use of common factor.
The following formulæ are the resultant divisor addition formulæ after applying the
CANH trick. Using the 15 common factors, 30 multiplications in F2 are replaced by 15
multiplications where one input is in F2 and the other is in F4 (M2,4). The output of this
multiplication is in F4; that is why a reduction in F4 is needed. In summary, the total cost
is 15 M2,4, 15 R4, 7 M2, 7 R2, 15 S, and 27 Add.
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M1 = Z2(U11 + V10δ), U˜11 = M1,0, y1 = U˜11 + U21, w0 = M1,1 + V20,
inv1 = y1, M2 = Z2(U10 + V11δ), y2 = U20 +M2,0, w1 = M2,1 + V21,
M3 = y1(U11 + w1δ), y3 = M3,0 + y2, inv0 = y3, w3 = M3,1,
M4 = y3(y2 + w0δ), w2 = M4,1, M5 = U10(y
2
1 + w3δ), r = M4,0 +M5,0,
s0 = w2 +M5,0, s1 = (inv0 + inv1) · (w0 + w1) + w2 + w3 · U11, M6 = r(Z2 + y1δ),
R = M6,0, M7 = Z2(s0 + s1δ), s2 = M7,0, s3 = M7,1, M8 = s0(s1 + s3δ),
w0 = M8,0, w2 = M8,1, M9 = s3(R + s1δ), R˜ = M9,0, w1 = M9,1,
M10 = w1(U21 + y2δ), w3 = M10,0, l0 = w0 · U20, l2 = w3 + w2,
l1 = (w1 + w0) · (U21 + U20) + l0 + w3, M11 = R(s1 +M6,1δ),
U˜ ′0 = s
2
2 + s
2
1 · y1U11 +M10,1 + R˜ +M11,1, U˜ ′1 = w1 · y1 +R2, M12 = R˜(U˜ ′0 + U˜ ′1δ),
U ′0 = M12,0, U
′
1 = M12,1, Z
′ = s23 · R˜, M13 = (l2 + U˜ ′1)(U˜ ′1 + U˜ ′0δ),
M14 = w4(V21 + V20δ), M15 = s
2
3((U˜
′
0 +M14,0 + l1) + (l0 +M14,1)δ),
V ′1 = M13,0 +M14,0, V
′
0 = M13,1 +M14,1,
6.3.2 Doubling
The following set of formulæ shows the the doubling formulæ as presented in [47]. There
are 29 M2, 29 R2, 7 S, and 20 Add.
Z2 = Z
2, w0 = V
2
1 , w1 = U
2
1 , , w2 = Z · U1, R = U0 · Z22 , inv1 = Z,
inv0 = w2, k1 = w1, k0 = U1 · w1 + Z · (Z · V1 + w0), w0 = k0 · inv0,
w1 = k1 · Z, s0 = w0 + Z · U0 · w1, s3 = (inv0 +Z)(k0 + k1) + w0 + w1 · (1 + U1),
R˜ = R · s1, w0 = s1 · s3, w1 = s0 · s3, w3 = w1 · Z, w4 = R · s3, l0 = U0 · w1,
l2 = U1 · w0, l1 = (w1 + w2) · (U1 + U0) + l0 + l2, U˜ ′0 = s20 + R˜, U˜ ′1 = R2,
U ′0 = U˜
′
0 · R˜, U ′1 = U˜ ′1 · R˜, Z ′ = s21 · R˜,
V ′0 = U˜
′
0 · (l2 + U˜ ′1 + w3) + s21 · (l0 + w4 · V0),
V ′1 = U˜
′
1 · (l2 + U˜ ′1 + w3) + s21 · (U˜ ′0 + R˜ + w4 · V1 + l1),
Table 6.4 shows the common factors of the doubling formulæ such that each pair is com-
bined in a single multiplication of a higher field. We observe that 11 pairs of multiplications
have common factors.
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Table 6.4: Summary of common factors in divisor doubling.
Multiplications
Common
Multiplications
Common
Factor Factor
Z · U1, U1 · w1 U1 k1 · Z, Z · V1 Z
Z · w1, Z · (Z · V1 + w0) Z Z · U0 · w1, U0 · Z22 , U0
s3 · Z, s0 · s3 s3 R · s1, s1 · s3 s1
w1 · Z, U0 · w1 w1 U˜ ′0 ·R, U˜ ′1 ·R R
U˜ ′0(l2 + U˜1 +w3), U˜1 ·
(l2 + U˜
′
1 + w3)
(l2 + U˜
′
1 + w3)
s21(l0 + w4 · V0), s21 ·
(V ′0 + R˜ + w4 · V1 + l1)
s21
w4 · V0, w4 · V1 w4
The following set of formulæ shows the proposed doubling formulæ after applying the
CANH trick. This formulæ set costs 11 M2,4, 11 R4, 7 M2, 7 R2, 7 S, and 20 Add.
Z2 = Z
2, w0 = V
2
1 , w1 = U
2
1 , M1 = U1(Z + w1δ), w2 = M1,0, inv1 = Z,
inv0 = w2, k1 = w1, M2 = Z(k1 + V1δ), w1 = M2,0,
M3 = Z(w1 + (M2,1 + w0)δ), k0 = M1,1 +M3,1, w0 = k0 · inv0
M4 = U0(M3,0 + Z
2
2δ), R = M4,1, s3 = (inv0 +Z) · (k0 + k1) + w0 + w1 · (1 + U1)
s0 = w0 +M4,1, M5 = s3(Z + s0δ), s1 = M5,0, w1 = M5,1,
M6 = s1(R + s3δ), R˜ = M6,0, w0 = M6,1, M7 = w1(Z + U0δ), w3 = M7,1,
w4 = R · s3, l0 = M7,1, l2 = U1 · w0, l1 = (w1 + w2) · (U1 + U0) + l0 + l2,
U˜ ′0 = s
2
0 + R˜, U˜
′
1 = R
2, M8 = R˜(U˜
′
0 + U˜
′
1δ), U
′
0 = M8,0, U
′
1 = M8,1,
Z ′ = s21 · R˜, M9 = (l2 + U˜ ′1 + w3)(U˜ ′0 + U˜ ′1δ), M10 = w4(V0 + V1δ),
M11 = s
2
1((l0 +M10,0) + (U˜
′
0 + R˜ +M10,1 + l1)δ), V
′
0 = M9,0 +M11,0,
V ′1 = M9,1 +M11,1.
6.3.3 Complexity comparison
Table 6.5 summarizes the total cost of both previous and proposed formulæ for addition
and doubling. The total arithmetic complexities of addition and doubling before and after
applying the CANH trick are shown in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.5: Cost comparison of previous and proposed formulæ.
Formulæ Previous Proposed
Addition 37M2+37R2+5S+27 Add
15M2,4 + 15R4 + 7M2 +
7R2 + 5S + 27 Add
Doubling 29M2+29R2+7S+20 Add
11M2,4 + 11R4 + 7M2 +
7R2 + 7S + 20 Add
Table 6.6: Complexity cost comparison of previous and proposed formulæ.
Formulæ Previous Proposed
Addition
231.99nlog3(6) − 51.79n −
116.2
43.89nlog3(6) +
461.25nlog3(5) −
34.95n log3(n) − 360.69n +
0.7
Doubling
181.83nlog3(6) − 29.43n −
103.4
43.89nlog3(6) +
338.25nlog3(5) −
25.63n log3(n) − 256.69n −
19.2
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In order to get an idea of how much the new algorithm improves the previous one,
figures showing the cost complexity versus the field size (n) are presented. Figure 6.1
shows the addition complexity comparison, and Figure 6.2 shows the complexities in the
case of doubling. In both cases, we see that there is an improvement that starts at around
120 bits. Below 108 bits, the proposed scheme will result in a degradation of the overall
performance. However, the improvement can go up to 80% at a very large field size.
Figure 6.3, which shows the amount of improvement up to field size of 570 bits, indi-
cates how much improvement can be achieved for this range. In the case of addition, the
improvement is a little bit more than that of doubling.
In order to relate Figure 6.3 to the equations in Table 6.6, it is observed that both
the previous and the proposed methodologies belong to the same asymptotic complexities,
i.e. O(nlog3(6)). The proposed methodology has a lower coefficient with respect to the
term nlog3(6), but it has an additional term nlog3(5) with a comparatively larger coefficient.
The dominant term is nlog3(6) and, therefore, the limit of improvement is 81% in the case
of addition, and 76% in the case of doubling. However, until this limit is reached, the
improvement will initially have the burden of the high coefficient of nlog3(5) term.
Figure 6.1: Addition complexity comparison.
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Figure 6.2: doubling complexity comparison.
Figure 6.3: Improvement percentage of double and add operations.
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Table 6.7: The improvement using CANH technique in hyperelliptic curves in certain field
sizes.
field
Addition im-
provement
Doubling im-
provement
163 3.391 3.65
233 6.87 6.86
283 8.75 8.61
409 12.28 11.88
571 15.41 14.79
1032 20.78 19.78
The improvement for specific field sizes are summarized in Table 6.7. These field sizes
are the NIST recommended fields in addition to 1032 bits value. The improvement goes
from around 3% at 163 to around 20% when the the field size is 1032.
Hyperelliptic curves usually work with a comparatively small key size. In this case, the
improvement is not as significant as it is if we go for higher sizes. For example, if the field
size is 100-bits, then there would be a degradation by around 1.3% using this technique.
In the case of working in hyperelliptic pairing, the extension field size is required to
be high, for example, for 80 bits security level, the extension field size is required to be
1024; while for 256 bit security level, the extension field size is 15360 [60]. For these
sizes of curves, the group law operations using the CANH technique achieve very good
improvement.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the use of field extension based 3-way split polynomial
multiplication to improve the speed of ηT pairing. Our theoretical analysis shows that an
improvement of 23.9% can be achieved using this method. Miller’s loop consumes almost all
the time in ηT pairing computation. Inside this loop, a multiplication in F24·1223 is present.
After reducing this multiplication we notice the presence of three pairs of a common factor
multiplication. We use a multiplication in F4[X] to replace two in F2[X]. Explicit formulæ
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and cost analysis are presented in this chapter.
In addition, in this chapter we have shown how to apply the CANH trick over hyperel-
liptic curves. The results show good improvement over most of the field sizes. The higher
the size the more the improvement to certain threshold.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Future Work
7.1 Summary
Polynomial multiplication is crucial in cryptography, especially for those systems that are
based on elliptic and hyper-elliptic curves. Several polynomial multiplication algorithms
have been studied in this proposal, namely, the K2W, K3W, IK3W, B3W and FE3W al-
gorithms. We have also showed two types of point addition and point doubling algorithms:
the conventional and the CANH ones. The CANH algorithms depend on the use of the
field extension polynomial multiplication algorithm and it replaces two polynomial multi-
plications in a lower field when there is a common operand between them. Utilizing CANH
trick in pairing and hyperelliptic curves proves to be useful. We found an improvement of
23.9% when using this method with ηT pairing computation. In the case of hyperelliptic
curves the use of CANH trick improves after certain threshold of field size, and perform
better for larger field size.
7.2 Future Work
In this section, we discuss three ideas for future work. These are CANH improvement and
extension, different uses of the common factor trick, and software and hardware realization.
87
CANH improvement and extension
CANH improves over the 3-way split algorithm, but it might not improve in other split
based algorithms. Therefore, the CANH trick shall only be used when it improves over the
split algorithm when it is needed in the polynomial multiplication. Making use of the field
extension has previously been considered only in 3-way split algorithms. As a result, one
direction of the future research is to look into other split based algorithms and see where
they can be improved.
Different use of common factor trick
In hyperelliptic curve addition, there is an occurrence of more than two terms that have
common factors. For example, if we have four multiplications like AB, AC, AD, and AE,
where A is a common factor. It will be interesting to investigate whether n multiplications
with one common input can be efficiently performed as a single multiplication where one
input is in F2 and the other in F2n .
Software/Hardware realization
Several libraries support different cryptography applications. Polymul [61] and zn poly [62],
for example, support efficient multiplication algorithms. Other libraries support number
theoretic and integer arithmetic applications like FLINT [63], GMP [64], NTL [65], GNU
PG [66]. Libraries support higher level algorithms for certain applications or protocols like
elliptic curve cryptography or other communication features like crypto++ [67], Cryptlib
[68], Libgcrypt [69], MIRACL [70], LiDIA [71], OpenSSL [72], and PARI-GP [73]. In [74],
one can find an excellent comparison between different software libraries used for public key
cryptography. It would be interesting to implement and optimize in software and hardware
the newer algorithms studied in this thesis and make a thorough comparison.
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Appendix A
Reduction Algorithms
Algorithm A.1 Reduction modulo f(z) = z233 + z74 + 1.
1: procedure Reduce233(x) . x is a polynomial of size maximum 2m− 2 where
m = 233.
2: ones← 2233 − 1.
3: temp← x 233.
4: result← x & ones
5: result← result⊕ (temp 74)⊕ temp.
6: temp← result 233.
7: result← result⊕ (temp 74)⊕ temp.
8: result← result & ones.
9: return result.
10: end procedure
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Algorithm A.2 Reduction modulo f(z) = z283 + z12 + z5 + 1.
1: procedure Reduce283(x) . x is a polynomial of size maximum 2m− 2 where
m = 283.
2: ones← 2283 − 1.
3: temp← x 283.
4: result← x & ones
5: result← result⊕ (temp 12)⊕ (temp 7)⊕ (temp 5)⊕ temp.
6: temp← result 283.
7: result← result⊕ (temp 12)⊕ (temp 7)⊕ (temp 5)⊕ temp.
8: result← result & ones.
9: return result.
10: end procedure
Algorithm A.3 Reduction modulo f(z) = z409 + z87 + 1.
1: procedure Reduce409(x) . x is a polynomial of size maximum 2m− 2 where
m = 409.
2: ones← 2409 − 1.
3: temp← x 409.
4: result← x & ones
5: result← result⊕ (temp 87)⊕ temp.
6: temp← result 409.
7: result← result⊕ (temp 87)⊕ temp.
8: result← result & ones.
9: return result.
10: end procedure
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Algorithm A.4 Reduction modulo f(z) = z512 + z10 + z5 + z2 + 1.
1: procedure Reduce512(x) . x is a polynomial of size maximum 2m− 2 where
m = 512.
2: ones← 2512 − 1.
3: temp← x 512.
4: result← x & ones
5: result← result⊕ (temp 12)⊕ (temp 7)⊕ (temp 5)⊕ temp.
6: temp← result 512.
7: result← result⊕ (temp 12)⊕ (temp 7)⊕ (temp 5)⊕ temp.
8: result← result & ones.
9: return result.
10: end procedure
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